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Chapter 1: Introduction  
In 1993, a historic agreement was finalized between the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and the Israelis. The Oslo Accord  was a grand surprise to the 
world because the Israelis had never before agreed to communicate with the PLO, 
whom they considered terrorists.1 The whole process leading up to the agreement had 
taken place in complete secrecy simultaneously with an official peace process that 
started in Madrid and continued in Washington.2 Few therefore had expected such 
agreement, and even fewer had expected that Norway, a small country with no 
political power to “push” the two parties, would play the peacemaking role.   
 
The Norwegians played the role as first facilitator, then mediator in the secret talks 
that would later be referred to as the Oslo Back Channel. The main reason why Yasser 
Arafat, the leader of the PLO, had requested the Norwegians to play this role back in 
1979 was the close relationship that the Norwegians had shared with the Israelis since 
the initiation of the Israeli state in 1948.3 He knew that the mediator to serve in a peace 
process between the PLO and Israel would not be accepted unless they had a good 
relationship with Israel, the United States, and the European Union, and Norway 
therefore emerged as a potential choice to him.4  Norway thus played a crucial role in 
the materialization of the Oslo Agreement.  
 
The Oslo accord was intended as an interim agreement. It included a mutual 
recognition of the two parties and an agreement of a future peace process, which, 
through an incremental approach, was meant to end in independence for the 
Palestinians, security in Israel, and, hopefully, a solution to this Middle Eastern 
conflict. After the Oslo Agreement was revealed to the public, the Norwegians were 
eager to extend their engagement from the Oslo Backchannel into the subsequent 
peace process through an extensive aid effort. As a donor, the Norwegians 
                                                
1 The Oslo Accord is also called the Oslo Agreement.  
2 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 511-513. 
3 Hilde Henriksen Waage, ”Explaining the Oslo Backchannel: Norway´s Political Past in the Middle East,” 
Middle East Journal 56, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 3. 
4 Waage, ”Explaining the Oslo Backchannel,” 12. 
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consequently increased their annual contribution of development aid to the 
Palestinians from 65 million NOK to an astonishing 250 million NOK. In 1993, the 
Norwegians envisioned to maintain this high level of aid for a period of five years. 
Unfortunately, the peace process did not proceed according to the plan laid out in the 
Oslo Agreement and in year 2000 the peace process collapsed completely as a new 
Intifada erupted. By this point, the Norwegian aid to the Palestinians had reached close 
to 500 million NOK per year.  
 
Following the materialization of this first interim agreement and the initiation of the 
process that would supposedly lead up to the actual peace agreement, Norway took on 
several prominent roles in the international aid effort. This gave the small nation a 
unique position in terms of administrating foreign aid and rendering judgment as to 
where the need was great and where one would “throw money out of the window.” 
Norway served, to mention some, as chair of the Ad Hoc Liasion Committee (AHLC), 
chair of the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC), leader of the Temporary 
International Presence in the City of Hebron (TIPH), member in the exclusive Joint 
Liasion Committee (JLC), as well as administrator of the People-to-People Program.5 
In a peace process between two adversaries, one very powerful and one not at all, it is 
therefore interesting to see how Norway managed to play its multiple roles as aid 
coordinator, donor, and monitor at the very same time. 
 
This master’s thesis will explore the political ambitions behind the Norwegian aid 
effort to the Middle East between 1993 and 2000. It seeks to comprehend why the 
Norwegian aid to the Palestinians increased as the peace process deteriorated. 
Moreover, it asks the question whether the belief that economic prosperity in the 
occupied territories would lead to peace, entrapped Norway in a pattern where it was 
committed to increase economic support in the aid effort as the situation between the 
PLO and the Israelis deteriorated.   
 
                                                
5 These will be introduced throughout the next chapters. 
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The Norwegian Policy of Engagement 
The Norwegian aid effort in the Oslo Peace Process was part of the extensive 
Norwegian Policy of Engagement. The term “Policy of Engagement” was coined by 
historian Rolf Tamnes and describes a trend in Norwegian foreign policy of investing 
considerable resources in improving the world in terms of alleviating poverty, 
preventing natural catastrophes, and striving towards peace. 6  According to the 
philosophy behind this line of action, Norwegian interest is served through such 
measures, as they are benevolent to the entire globe.7 In 2008, a Storting White Paper 
explained the correlation between Norwegian Engagement Policy and the global 
advantages in the following manner: “Norway should be among the leading political 
and financial partners in the international humanitarian effort and contribute in such 
manner that the international society is best possibly prepared and equipped to face the 
challenges of the future.”8  
 
The Engagement Policy had grown in Norway since the 1970s, and by 1990 this was 
one of the most distinctive characters of the nation’s foreign policy.9 During the 
nineties, peace, democracy, and human rights were considered prerequisites for 
development to a larger degree than earlier and the Norwegian effort and support for 
such priorities was greatly escalated.10 One of the reasons behind this escalation was 
that the Engagement Policy was considered less left wing after the collapse of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).11  Moreover, according to political 
scientist Turid Lægreid, security concerns had dominated the foreign policy of 
Norway throughout the Second World War and the Cold War. When the Cold War 
                                                
6 Rolf Tamnes, Norsk Utenrikspolitikks Historie, Vol. 6, Oljealder (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997); “Norway’s 
policy of engagement,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/tema/fred_og_forsoning/norway_engagement.html?id=587985.  
7 Frode Liland and Kirsten Alsaker Kjerland, Norsk Utviklingshjelps historie, Vol 3, 1989-2002 På Bred Front 
(Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2003),14.  
8 “St. meld nr. 40 (2008-2009) Norsk humanitær politikk. 3 Humanitær engasjementspolitikk,” Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/regpubl/stmeld/2008-2009/stmeld-nr-40-2008-2009-
/3.html?id=563847. 
9 Tamnes, Oljealder, 344.  
10 Liland and Kjerland, På Bred Front, 14.  
11 Tamnes, Oljealder, 342. 
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came to an end, a vacuum opened in the foreign policy, which the Norwegians filled 
with an enterprise to create an image of Norway as a humanitarian superpower.12 
 
Concurrently with the development of the Engagement Policy, money from a booming 
oil industry had made Norway one of the wealthiest countries in the world per capita. 
This opened a possibility for Norway to be able to donate aid and in this manner 
impact the new world within its own ideology.13 Norwegians felt optimistic and self-
confident after the defeat of the USSR and their own recent prosperous development, 
and were eager to help others attain what they had already achieved. The high 
percentage of Christians and social democrats in the population had built a strong 
missionary sense into the national identity, while at the same time the small country 
wanted to build a permanent identity in the international community. The small nation 
of Norway therefore felt strongly for influencing other countries in their own image. 
When Sweden, on top of it all, experienced a financial recession, Norway took over its 
neighbor´s position as peace nation in the Nordic region. There were thus few 
obstacles to prevent Norway from gaining political support for a considerable 
extension of the Policy of Engagement.14   
 
Along with the expansion of the Engagement Policy, a strong sense of altruism and 
idealism grew in the Norwegian society in the 1990s. This development was 
particularly noticeable among many of the prominent national leaders, politicians, and 
diplomats who played leading roles in the Norwegian aid effort to the Palestinians, for 
example Kjell Magne Bondevik, Bjørn Tore Godal, Knut Vollebæk, and Jan 
Egeland.15  
 
An essential part of the Norwegian Engagement Policy is the Norwegian Model, 
which constitutes a triangular cooperation between the Norwegian government, the 
                                                
12 Liland and Kjerland, På Bred Front, 84.  13	  Helge Pharo, ”Altruism, Security and the Impact of Oil: Norway´s Foreign Economic Assistance Policy, 
1958- 1971,” Contemporary European History 12, no. 4 (2003): 546.	  
14 Liland and Kjerland, På Bred Front, chapter 3; Tamnes, Oljealder, Chapter 1 of part IV. 
15 Liland and Kjerland, På Bred Front, 83. 
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academics, and the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).16  According to Terje 
Tvedt, author of the book Development Aid, Foreign Policy and Power: the 
Norwegian Model, the model has been presented as an “optimal tool to implement 
altruistic goals in the global arena and is marketed as the nation´s trademark product in 
the era of internationalization.”17 Tvedt contends that the achievements of the Oslo 
Back Channel were the crowning jewel of the Norwegian Model. This success served 
as the ideal example for the model.18 This is one of the reasons why it was 
tremendously important for the Norwegians that the Oslo Agreement and the 
subsequent Oslo Peace Process concluded in peace.  
 
Entrapment in Negotiations: a Theoretical Framework 
The research question of this thesis asks whether Norway became entrapped in the 
foreign aid strategy that it pursued. Entrapment theory is drawn upon in this 
assignment as a tool to help elucidate this phenomenon. 
 
The theory of entrapment was originally developed by the political sociologist C. 
Wright Mills as a tool to describe the individual’s relation to the state.19 This concept 
has later been transferred to other phenomena. In recent time, Paul Meerts, Professor 
in International Negotiation Analysis, has theoretically approached entrapment in 
negotiation processes and this is the approach closest related to the topic of this 
assignment.   
 
Meerts uses the following definition of entrapment: “A decision-making process in 
which individuals strengthen their commitment to a previously chosen, though failing, 
course of action to justify or recover the prior investments.”20 Entrapment can occur, 
                                                
16 Terje Tvedt, Utviklingshjelp, Utenrikspolitikk og Makt: Den Norske Modellen (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 
2009), 42; ”Den norske modellen,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/veiledninger/2005/den-norske-modellen.html?id=439681. 
17 Tvedt, Den Norske Modellen, 42. 
18 Tvedt, Den Norske Modellen, 41.  
19 Mills C. Wright, The Sociological Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959)  
20 This definition was originally developed by Brockner and Rubin in their book Entrapment in Escalating 
Conflict: J. Brockner and J. Z. Rubin, Entrapment in Escalating Conflict: A Social Psychological Analysis (New 
York: Springer Verlag, 1985), 5; Paul W Meerts, "Entrapment in International Negotiations," in Escalation and 
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in other words, as a consequence of a strategy that has been invested so heavily in that 
the political consequence of admitting failure is not an option if one wants to survive 
politically. The same strategy that has already failed once is therefore applied again in 
an attempt to revive lost goods. However, this makes the situation grow worse and one 
is entrapped in a bad spiral. Consequently, every time the failing course of action is 
applied the range of options and reactions for the entrapped party diminishes.  
 
The process of being entrapped is not a result of a single act, but of a number of 
disadvantageous, yet repeated, strategic moves. The eventually entrapped party often 
makes its first move at a point when the party has a range of options from which to 
choose. One of the primary factors that contribute to entrapping a party is that a 
decision has to be made before certainty is reached.21 In other words, one party plans a 
move based on the most logical assumption at the time. The move that is decided upon 
is subsequently put into practice accompanied with a heavy investment, still without 
the representatives of that party being sure that it is the right choice. When this move 
fails, one tries to regain the investment through another attempt and a pattern of 
repetition occurs. By shortsightedly attempting to act in one’s own interest, the party 
ends up harming its own cause.22  
 
The best tool to avoid or create an entrapment situation is information.23 By possessing 
information that the other party of a negotiation relationship does not hold, one can 
control the process of entrapment. The smaller or weaker party in a negotiation 
process thus often uses entrapment as a diplomatic tool in an attempt to gain the upper 
side. Though entrapment can be used as a strategic tool in diplomatic relationship, it 
does not necessarily need to be so.24 This assignment does not claim that Norway was 
entrapped due to conscious planning by any party but simply makes the observation 
that a phenomenon of entrapment took place. The United States, for example, became 
                                                                                                                                                   
Negotiation in International Conflicts, 111-141, eds. I William Zartmann and Guy Olivier Faure (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 113. 
21 Meerts, "Entrapment in International Negotiations," 111-116. 
22 Meerts, "Entrapment in International Negotiations," 115-122.  
23 Meerts, "Entrapment in International Negotiations," 129.  
24 Meerts, "Entrapment in International Negotiations," 131. 
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entrapped in Vietnam not because Vietnam planned for it to occur that way, but due to 
external factors. In this sense, one can say that the entrapment process described in this 
assignment was self-inflicted because no external party intentionally caused the 
process to occur.  
 
The main sign of an entrapment situation is that one party finds itself in a situation it 
cannot get out of without considerable loss.25 This situation came into existence 
because the party followed a strategy and this strategy proved to fail. Meerts calls 
entrapment an escalation process, meaning that there is no yes or no answer as to 
whether a party is entrapped; it is rather a question of degree. He clarifies that there is 
a distinction between escalation and entrapment. While escalation is a mutually 
coercive mechanism, which maintains the power balance between two conflicting 
parties, an entrapment process is where one party loses and another gains from its 
loss.26   
 
Methodological Approach 
While this thesis does merge elements from history, political science, and economy, it 
is mainly rooted in history. Furthermore, though a master’s thesis about an economic 
development necessarily includes references to statistics, graphs, and numerical data 
within the quantitative tradition, this assignment is written from a qualitative approach. 
The economic developments are therefore, for the most part, explained in words and 
not through figures. Furthermore, in order to recount sums as accurately as possible, 
two different currencies are used intertwined: United States Dollar (USD) and 
Norwegian Krone (NOK).   
 
The primary sources in this thesis are archival documents, public reports published by 
the government, and one interview. The research for this thesis is carried out in three 
different archives: the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Archive 
of the Storting of Norway, and the Archive of the Norwegian Agency for 
                                                
25 Meerts, "Entrapment in International Negotiations," 7. 
26 Meerts, "Entrapment in International Negotiations," 119-120. 
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Development Cooperation (NORAD).27 One interview has been executed with Petter 
Bauck, Senior Adviser in NORAD´s Department for Economic Development Energy, 
Gender, and Governance. In line with the qualitative approach this is an unstructured 
interview, meaning that no standardized questionnaire has been used. The interview 
has been transcribed and translated from Norwegian by the author of this thesis. 
 
Knowledge Gap 
 Extensive research has been done on international aid to the Palestinian Authority in 
the Oslo Peace Process period. Already in 2000, Rex Brynen published the book A 
Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza. 
In 2008 Routledge Studies on the Arab-Israeli Conflict published the book 
International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo by Anne Le More.  The 
information provided in these books is essential in order to comprehend the 
interconnection between the Norwegian and the international aid effort.  
 
Considering the wide-ranging explorations of international aid to the Palestinians, one 
would think that there would have been done lots of research on the correlation 
between Norway’s political approach in peace negotiations and their financial 
contributions. However, to the extent of my knowledge there are few publications 
within this subject. Hilde Henriksen Waage´s book Peacemaking is a Risky Business, 
which explores the Norwegian role in the peace process in the Middle East from 1993 
till 1996, includes information relevant to the topic. This is the only comprehensive 
publication of research done on the Norwegian role in the Oslo Peace Process. 
Additionally, Waage has written a book chapter about the Norwegian political 
approach in the Oslo Process called Norsk fredspolitikk i Midtøsten which contains 
significant material. Finally, there are a few pages on the subject in the book På bred 
front by Frode Liland and Kirsten Alsaker Kjerland, but little in-depth information. 
Bearing in mind the looming question of why Norway would continue international 
aid despite the faltering peace process and the limited research published on the 
subject, it can thus be concluded that there is a considerable knowledge gap.  
                                                
27 The name of the Norwegian parliament is the Storting.  
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Chapter	  2:	  Norwegian	  Aid	  to	  the	  Palestinians	  
Before	  the	  Oslo	  Agreement	  (1948-­‐1993)	  
Before the Norwegians played their role in the creation of the Oslo Agreement, 
Norway had not had an overall strategy or one specific political philosophy behind the 
foreign aid it had donated to the Middle East. Norway had acted merely as an aid 
provider, similar to many other nations. This chapter explores Norwegian foreign aid 
to the Palestinians and the political implications behind this assistance before the Oslo 
agreement.  
 
Prior to 1993, the year of the Oslo Agreement, the Norwegian foreign aid to the 
Palestinians was mainly channeled through the United Nations Relief and Work 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). UNRWA was established 
in 1949 to provide services for the Palestinian refugees located in Lebanon, Syria, 
Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza. The organization was originally intended as a 
temporary arrangement, but in the absence of a solution to the conflict between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians, the organization has repeatedly had its mandate 
updated.28  
 
From the Initiation of Israel as a State to the Intifada 
From the very initiation of the Israeli state in 1948, the Norwegian political and public 
support for the Israelis had been resilient.29 In 1949, Norway was the only country in 
Scandinavia to vote in favor of Israeli UN membership and grant Israel de jure 
recognition.30 The strong ties between the Norwegians and the Israelis were, according 
to Hilde Henriksen Waage, due to the European collective guilt for the treatment of the 
Jews during World War Two, the strong Christian roots in Norway, and the fact that 
                                                
28 ”About UNRWA,” United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 
http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=47. 
29 Hilde Henriksen Waage, ”How Norway Became One of Israel´s Best Friends” Journal of Peace Research 37, 
no. 2 (2000): 193. 
30 Waage, ”How Norway Became One of Israel´s Best Friends,” 196-197. 
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both nations were social democracies.31 The sense of unity was further strengthened in 
November 1949 by a plane crash in Norway. The plane carried 27 Jewish children 
who were to participate in a school program located in Norway meant to prepare them 
for their arrival in Israel. Various initiatives to honor the memory of the children who 
died in the plane crash created more direct links and communication between the 
Israelis and the Norwegians. The biggest of these initiatives was the construction of a 
Norwegian kibbutz in Israel.32 The crash subsequently triggered more Norwegian 
sympathy toward the situation of the Jews in Israel and a closer relationship between 
leading politicians in the governments of the nations that were both led by the Labor 
Party.33  
 
The one-sided and uncritical Norwegian support for the Israelis endured throughout 
the 1950´s without question as to the situation for the Arabs who had lived in the land 
of Palestine before the Jews turned the same territory into the state of Israel.34 Norway 
was constantly informed by the United Nations (UN) of the challenges created in the 
Middle East by the massive wave of Palestinian refugees. Not withstanding, Norway 
considered it the responsibility of the Arab countries to integrate Palestinian refugees 
just as the Israelis had to integrate multitudes of Jewish immigrants from around the 
world.35 Norway did send some surplus of fish to the Palestinian refugees as a 
response to UN appeals for humanitarian aid. However, upon receipts of reports 
indicating that the fish were rotten and that other commodities were more needed, the 
Norwegians simply continued the export of its fish surplus and protecting its national 
fishing industry without further consideration as to what the Palestinians actually 
needed.36 Furthermore, Norway rejected an appeal for construction supplies from the 
UN on behalf of the Palestinian refugees. Whereas the 1950s were a time when the 
                                                
31 Hilde Henriksen Waage, Peacemaking is a Risky Business: Norway´s role in the Peace Process in the Middle 
East 1993-96 (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2004), 31-46. 
32 A kibbutz is a collective community in Israel. Traditionally these used to revolve around development of 
agriculture.  
33 Hilde Henriksen Waage, Norge-Israels Beste Venn: Norsk Midtøsten Politikk 1949-56 (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1996), 20-27.  
34 Waage, ”How Norway Became One of Israel´s Best Friends,” 198-200. 
35 Waage, ” How Norway Became One of Israel´s Best Friends,” 200.  
36 Waage, Norge-Israels Beste Venn, 84 and 91; Waage, ”How Norway Became One of Israel´s Best Friends,” 
201.  
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Norwegians were working hard to reconstruct their own country in the aftermath of 
World War II, it was not surprising that Norway protected its construction resources 
for its own usage. However, when Norway built and maintained the Norwegian 
kibbutz in Israel, it sent two ships of seasoned timber to Israel despite the great 
shortage in Norway. So while Norway denied the UN´s pleas for aid to the Palestinian 
refugees, it did grant building materials to Israel that were scarce in Norway. This 
clearly reflected the differentiated political stance that Norway held in relation to the 
two conflicting parties.37  
 
In the latter part of the 1960s, a short, yet significant, war occurred that ultimately 
made the Norwegians more cognizant of the situation for the Palestinians. During the 
Six-Day War in 1967, the Israelis occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, 
the old part of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights: this Israeli victory of geographically-
expanded authority was a devastating blow for the Arabs and caused another massive 
wave of Palestinian refugees.38 A long-term consequence of this war was a broadened 
interest and understanding among Norwegians for the Palestinian´s predicament. 
Furthermore, it was vital to Norwegian interests that the Suez Canal remain open, 
whereas Norwegian maritime trade was heavily dependent on this passage. When the 
Egyptians closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships and other ships carrying strategic 
goods for the Israelis, the Norwegians realized, granted the proximity between the 
Egyptians and the Palestinians, that they needed to take a more diplomatic approach to 
the Palestinian cause.39 In 1967, Norway approved an additional two million NOK to 
the Palestinians. That same year, Norway also voted in favor of Resolution 242, which 
acknowledged Israel´s right to exist within recognized borders, while clearly 
communicating that it was unacceptable to the UN that Israel occupied land through 
force and that the UN sought a just solution to the refugee problem. In 1969, the 
general contribution to UNRWA was increased by twenty percent, which meant that 
Norway contributed 800,000 NOK. Though this was a considerable increase, it was 
still a merely moderate sum in comparison to what Denmark and Sweden contributed. 
                                                
37 Waage, “How Norway Became One of Israel´s Best Friends”, 200-201. 
38 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 241-250.  
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12	  
 
The reason behind this difference was that the support for Israel was still strong in 
Norway and the political cost of increasing the foreign aid to the Palestinians would 
thus have been larger in Norway than in the other Scandinavian countries. 40 
 
In the transition between the sixties and the seventies multiple events unfolded that 
were not directly linked to the situation in the Middle East, but which still caused the 
Norwegians to increase their financial aid to the Palestinians. In the beginning of the 
sixties the UN had initiated a project by which it was desired, ultimately, that each 
richer nation would contribute about one percent of its Gross National Product (GNP) 
in aid. Nonetheless, in 1967, the Norwegians were ranked by the Organization for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) as the second-worst aid 
contributor to poor countries.41 Even though the Norwegians would have liked to 
contribute more, the Norwegians did not have an economy that enabled them to stand 
out as a donor in the international community. In 1969, however, oil was found in 
Ekofisk in the Norwegian Sea. This, and subsequent discoveries of oil, severely 
expanded the Norwegian economy which, in turn, increased the development aid 
budget.42 It now became feasible for the Norwegians to transform into an aid provider 
worth noticing, while at the same time the Arab countries had become more vital to 
Norwegian interests because of their common oil industry.43 During the same time 
period, UNRWA was experiencing an economic crisis and the Norwegians suggested 
the expansion of the organization by the addition of an ad hoc group intended to help 
solve the financial crises in the organization. Other member countries in UNRWA 
welcomed this suggestion and Norway subsequently assumed a role as rapporteur to 
the newly established group. This expanded role in the UN organization was 
considered a good opportunity to reach the new Norwegian aim of distinguishing itself 
through aid. It also inspired the Norwegians to want to set a good example for other 
member nations of UNRWA. In 1974 the Norwegians subsequently contributed eight 
                                                
40 Jostein Peter Eikrem, ”Ein ubetydelig bidragsytar? Norsk bistand til palestinske flyktningar, 1967-1993” 
(Master´s thesis, University of Oslo, 2011), 29-33. 
41 Tamnes, Oljealder, 390-392; Eikrem, ”Ein ubetydelig bidragsytar?,” 40.  
42 Pharo, ”Altruism, Security and the Impact of Oil,” 542.  
43 Tamnes, Oljealder, 186-187; Eikrem, ”Ein ubetydelig bidragsytar?,” 40-41.   
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million NOK to UNRWA—ten times more than the general contribution had been in 
1969.44 
 
The Norwegians also considered peace operations a good opportunity to extend their 
new role as aid provider. In 1970, a civil war erupted in Jordan, which led thousands 
of Palestinians previously living in Jordan to immigrate to Lebanon.45 Eight years 
later, in March 1978, the Israelis occupied most of the southern part of Lebanon in an 
attempt to combat the Palestinians fighting from the Lebanese territory. The Lebanese 
consequently submitted a protest to the Security Council, and the UN quickly adopted 
two resolutions that called on the Israelis to withdraw from Lebanon. Additionally, a 
force named the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established 
to maintain control in the interim period while the Israelis were expected to withdraw 
and help restore the situation back to normal.46 Out of the total 6000 servicemen in the 
operation, the Norwegians battalion (NORBATT) turned up strong in numbers with 
930 soldiers. While most of the Norwegian soldiers were full of admiration for the 
Israelis before they traveled to Lebanon with UNIFIL, the grand majority returned to 
Norway with a completely changed view after having been exposed to the Israeli 
conduct in the conflict. Furthermore, with several hundreds of soldiers in the field, the 
Norwegian media coverage of the Middle East improved and the average Norwegian 
thus learned more about the Arab perspective and the plight of the Palestinians.47 The 
Israelis withdrew the summer 1978, but, as they controlled the South Lebanon Army 
(SLA) militia, they continued to extend their authority throughout the southern 
Lebanese territory. Several clinches between the Norwegians and the SLA did, to a 
certain degree, balance the Norwegian attitude towards the conflict between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis, as the Norwegians came to find that the Israelis did too 
little to prevent the attacks from happening.48 Having 930 soldiers in Lebanon was no 
                                                
44 Eikrem, ”Ein ubetydelig bidragsytar?,” 39-43. 
45 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 298.  
46 ”United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,” United Nations, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/background.shtml. 
47 Waage, ”Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians? Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway´s Political Past in 
the Middle East” Evaluation Report no.9/2000 (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000), 42-
43.  
48 Eikrem, ”Ein ubetydelig bidragsytar?,”56-57.  
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cheap initiative. The general contribution to UNRWA in 1978 was fifteen million 
NOK. In addition, two extraordinary contributions of one million NOK each were 
donated to alleviate the situation for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.49 Towards 
the end of the seventies, Norway had thus turned into a donor country worth noticing 
in the Middle East.  
 
Starting in 1982, Norway increased its foreign aid budget by one billion, which meant 
that they finally reached the UN-defined aim of donating one percent of its GNP in 
international assistance.50 That same year, the Israelis again invaded the southern part 
of Lebanon where the Norwegian soldiers were still serving.  This second invasion 
was much more brutal than the first and weakened the PLO´s undertakings in 
Lebanon.51 During this war, on September 16, 1982, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 
allowed the Phalangists, an aggressive militia of Christian Lebanese that had grown 
out of a political party opposed to Pan-Arabism, to enter the two refugee camps of 
Sabra and Shatila in order to “clean out terrorists”. The Phalangists executed a 
massacre while in the camps and killed, at the very least, 800 Palestinian refugees. 
This incident led the Western countries, including Norway, toward a less Israel-
friendly stance.52 The Norwegians expanded their general contribution to UNRWA 
from 22.5 million in 1982 to 55 million in 1984.53 This increase was a result of both 
the Norwegian change in attitude towards the Palestinians and of the increase in 
Norwegian aid to one percent of GNP.  
 
From Intifada to the Oslo Agreement  
Towards the end of the 1980s, the internal conditions in the occupied territories were 
in upheaval. General Commissioner of UNRWA Giorgio Giacomello warned the 
world that the living conditions for the Palestinians situated in Gaza were unbearable 
                                                
49 Eikrem, ”Ein ubetydelig bidragsytar?,”59. 
50 Tamnes, Oljealder, 392; Eikrem, ”Ein ubetydelig bidragsytar?,” 76. 
51 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 533 and 538.  
52 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 415-416 and 342.  
53 Eikrem, ”Ein ubetydelig bidragsytar?,” 69 and 74. 
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and a disaster waiting to happen.54 This proved to be correct in 1987 as the outbreak of 
the Intifada, a civil rebellion, started in Gaza and grew into massive and intense 
protests among the Palestinian refugees in the occupied territories. The Israelis fought 
against the non-violent protests with violence in order to silence the rebellion, but, to 
their great surprise, this only strengthened the uprisings. International media 
broadcasted pictures of Palestinian men and women in dirty and tattered clothes who 
were beaten up and shot at by the Israeli soldiers. This boosted the international 
support for the Palestinians, both politically and economically.55  
 
Both before and after the eruption of the Intifada, the Norwegians in the MFA were 
well aware of the situation for the Palestinians living in Gaza. One of the reports from 
the Norwegian Embassy of Israel to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in 1990 
concluded that the living conditions in Gaza were so poor that no one wanted the 
area.56 The Intifada had caused the severe situation in Gaza to grow even worse.  Forty 
percent of the population was younger than fourteen years old, and there was an 
annual population growth of five percent in the already over-populated strip of land. 
The sewage system was open and a severe lack of water made it nearly impossible to 
grow much. The limitation on the number of available job positions in Israel was 
stricter than ever before, and it was extremely hard to maintain any economic activity 
in a war-ridden area with constant restrictions imposed by the Israelis. Without the 
help of UNRWA, the report elaborated, starvation or an epidemic of disastrous 
proportions would most probably have occurred. However, if the situation was to 
remain the same the area would, the report predicted, still at least deteriorate into both 
a permanent poorhouse and powder keg by the year of 2000.57  
 
Despite the strong wording concerning the situation in Gaza, the problematic internal 
conditions and the great risk of epidemics, and notwithstanding several sectors within 
the MFA recognizing the importance and necessity of the project; Norway turned 
                                                
54 Benjamin N. Schiff, Refugees unto the Third Generation (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 220-
230.  
55 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 450-455.  
56 MFA UNRWA 26 6/23 (44), Tel Aviv to MFA, July 3, 1990.  
57 MFA UNRWA 26 6/23 (44), Tel Aviv to MFA, July 3, 1990.  
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down several appeals for funding UNRWA´s new project of building a hospital in 
Gaza.58 There were various reasons why the appeals were turned down. A preparation 
note for Foreign Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik expressed concern that the donor 
community- though with various exceptions such as Sweden, Kuwait, Finland and 
Spain- worried that constructing a hospital was beyond the scope of UNRWA´s 
mandate and thus could be interpreted as a political act. The dissenting countries 
believed it should be the responsibility of the occupying power to provide such 
services to the people living in the occupied territories. Additionally, the note 
concluded that Norway was, in principle, against UNRWA taking on a political task in 
the conflict. Most importantly, though, the various sectors within the Foreign Ministry 
established that this project was beyond the concentration principle for Norwegian 
financial aid.59 This line of reasoning was also mentioned in the informal donor 
meeting on June 6, 1990. The Norwegian delegation stated that assistance to the 
hospital should not be expected from Norway because “one should not make 
commitments to projects that could undermine the demand to Israel to act, in all 
regards, according to the demands, stipulated by international law, to Israel as an 
occupying power.”60 On November 14, 1991 a Nordic common contribution was 
sketched for the UN’s 46th General Council. While the other Nordic countries wanted 
to include a paragraph in favor of UNRWA’s initiative to create a hospital in Gaza, 
Norway wanted this cut out of the document.61 Though the Norwegian government 
wanted to be primarily preoccupied with internal conditions of the countries to which 
they contributed aid, this example goes to show that this was not entirely the case in 
the Middle East: The political considerations, especially in relation to the Israeli 
perception, were still highly important.  
 
Though the MFA rejected the appeal for funding the new hospital, Norway did attempt 
to take into consideration the steep population growth of the Palestinians— an annual 
                                                
58 MFA UNRWA 26 6/23 (44), Note, March 27, 1990; MFA UNRWA 26 6/23 (44), Note, July 4, 1990.  
59 The concentration principle stipulates that Norwegian aid should be donated to a limited number of countries 
and sectors: “Utviklingssamarbeid,” Store Norske Leksikon, http://snl.no/utviklingssamarbeid; MFA UNRWA 
26 6/23 (44), Note, June 15, 1990. 
60 MFA UNRWA 26 6/23 (44), Note, June 11, 1990.  
61 MFA UNRWA 26 6/23 (46), The UN delegation in New York to MFA, November 14, 1991.  
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five percent increase in Norway´s development aid to the Palestinians was necessary 
to maintain the status quo.62 Norway thus increased the general contribution in 1990 
with one million NOK, which brought the total general contribution to 65 million 
NOK.63 Though this made Norway one of the top contributors to UNRWA, it was 
remarked on multiple occasions in the Norwegian internal correspondence concerning 
UNRWA that Sweden had decided to increase their contribution. With a donation of 
130 million Swedish Krones, Sweden ranked as the second largest contributor to 
UNRWA.64 The sense of competition was always present between the Norwegians and 
the Swedes and did serve as an encouragement to increase their donations even further 
for the Norwegians.  
 
Towards the end of 1990, the situation in the Gulf became the single most important 
influence on the conflict in the Middle East. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the 
PLO had been forced to move its headquarters to Tunis and the geographic distance 
between the PLO and the people in the occupied territories was vast.65 During the 
Intifada, which had started independently of the PLO, academic youth had assumed 
lead roles among Palestinians and thus challenged the authority of the PLO as the sole 
representative of the people.66 In the subsequent process of striving to maintain its 
political status, the PLO received economic support from Saddam Hussein, the 
President of Iraq.67 Iraq´s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 had infuriated the 
surrounding Arab countries. Nevertheless, most of the countries in the Middle East 
were reluctant to wage a war against the Iraqis, whereas they were worried how this 
might influence the balance of power between Israel and the other Middle Eastern 
countries. The one who worried the most about this particular point was Arafat.68 
                                                
62 MFA UNRWA 26 6/23 (44), Note, June 11, 1990.  
63 MFA UNRWA 26 6/23 (44), MFA to Vienna, January 15, 1990; MFA UNRWA 26 6/23 (44), MFA to 
Vienna, January 25, 1990.   
64 MFA UNRWA 26 6/23 (44), Fax from Vienna to MFA, January 24, 1990; MFA UNRWA 26 6/23 (44), 
Vienna to MFA, January 23, 1990.  
65 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 413. 
66 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 459-460; Morris, Righteous Victims, 563-565.  
67 PLO Executive Committee, ”On the Intifada (December 1987)” in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary 
History of the Middle East Conflict, eds. Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin (New York: Penguin Books, 2008), 
315. 
68 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 474.  
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Furthermore, in a rhetorical move that appealed to the Palestinians, Saddam Hussein 
compared his occupation of Kuwait with the Israeli occupation of land and proposed a 
peace plan for the Middle East in which he demanded Israel to withdraw from all land 
they had occupied.69 In this manner, he gained the support of the PLO and the 
Palestinians. However, Arafat´s choice of supporting Hussein soon proved to be a 
political mistake for the leader of the PLO as the consequences for the Palestinians 
were fatal, both politically and economically. Kuwait expelled about 300.000 
Palestinian workers, the Gulf countries ended their financial backing of the 
Palestinians, and the Israeli border closures led to serious economic devastation. In 
addition, Arafat´s decision to back Hussein had a strongly negative impact on the 
international view of the Palestinians. 70    
 
The Norwegian reaction to the Gulf Crisis was to earmark 76.1 million NOK to 
humanitarian initiatives in 1990. Nine million was given to Jordan and ostensibly to 
the Palestinian refugees who had immigrated to Jordan from Kuwait. However, none 
of the money was given specifically to the Palestinians.71 In 1991, the donation rose to 
130 million NOK, from which 15 million NOK was given to Israel and 89.5 million 
NOK was donated to the Kurds. The remaining money was devoted to miscellaneous 
purposes, one of which was the Palestinian cause.72 Most of the Palestinian workers 
returning from Kuwait to the Occupied Territories were dependent on aid. This 
subsequently caused considerable disturbances in the already fragile UNRWA budget. 
The Norwegian fiscal budget reserved 50 million NOK in emergency aid for those 
affected by the crisis, yet only a minor portion of this was channeled through 
UNRWA.73 All in all, the aid to the Palestinians in the aftermath of the Gulf War was 
fairly meager. 
 
                                                
69 Avi Shlaim, Israel and Palestine (New York: Verso, 2009),145. 
70 Morris, Righteous Victims, 612-613. 
71 The Storting, ”Rapport om Norges samarbeid med utviklingslandene 1990. 5.6” White paper no. 49, 1990-
1991.  
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The Norwegian donations to the Palestinians channeled through UNRWA had grown 
considerably during the seventies and the eighties, yet at the beginning of the nineties, 
the donations stabilized around 65 million NOK.74 This was puzzling considering the 
Norwegian engagement policy and the strong Norwegian economy. It is possible that 
donations were not increased further because of Norwegian unhappiness with 
UNRWA. The Norwegians had emphasized on several occasions that they wanted a 
more prominent role in the organization through increased import of Norwegian goods 
and more Norwegian employees in high-ranking positions. In 1991, the Norwegians 
again stressed that the import of Norwegian goods and services ought to be part of 
what the Norwegian aid to UNRWA should be spent on.75 It was also emphasized that 
Norway was under-represented in terms of number of employees working in the 
organization in relation to the size of the Norwegian donations.76  
 
The Norwegian request to be more included did not cause the desired change in terms 
of imports. This was not, however, entirely to blame on UNRWA. The Norwegian 
goods were often unsuited for the conditions in the Middle East or unable to compete 
with international prices. In April 1991, the Norwegians decided to re-evaluate 
financial aid donated to the Middle East. Political Advisor Jan Egeland was sent to the 
occupied territories as a part of the ongoing evaluation.77 During this visit he 
communicated to UNRWA that it was a Norwegian wish to earmark a minor 
percentage of the Norwegian general contribution to UNRWA for specific projects in 
the budget for 1992. He was specifically looking for a project that was suitable for 
delivery of Norwegian goods such as prefabs for buildings.78 Out of the 65 million 
NOK Norway contributed annually, Norway preferred to earmark about 10-15 million 
NOK.79 By earmarking a percentage of the general contribution, the Norwegians 
exerted pressure on UNRWA to import Norwegian goods.  
 
                                                
74 The Storting,”Rapport om Norges samarbed med utviklingslandene 1992,” White Paper no.9, Annex 11, 
1993-1994. 
75 MFA UNRWA 26 6/23 (45), Tel Aviv to MFA, 1990.  
76 MFA UNRWA 26 6/23 (45), Beirut to MFA, November 14, 1990.  
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Throughout earlier attempts to enforce the inclusion of Norwegian goods, UNRWA 
had persistently argued that it was a better option to buy commodities for the 
Palestinians from the Palestinians themselves. Through this approach they not only 
provided short-term aid, but they also strengthened Palestinian trade, which meant 
more long-term job positions. This was an extension of UNRWA´s mission to prepare 
the Palestinians for becoming an independent state. However, in a letter treating the 
various proposals that UNRWA had suggested to use the earmarked money on, the 
Norwegian Trade Council wrote to the MFA that “it should be specified to UNRWA 
that it from Norwegian side is heavily weighted to include Norwegian deliveries, even 
though it is indicated in the project suggestion that the inputs should be bought 
locally.”80 Norway subsequently received two suggestions for what it could fund with 
the earmarked money, it could either build a part of the hospital in Gaza or it could 
build classrooms. Norway did not consider supporting the hospital as an option and 
chose to build classrooms.81 The Norwegians thus contributed an additional sum of 
907,000 USD for the purpose of building classrooms.82  In this case, as in former 
cases, despite the increased pressure and the extraordinary contribution, UNRWA 
again turned down an offer to import Norwegian prefabricated houses or other 
components within construction with the same reasoning as before; ”because it is 
UNRWA´s political philosophy to use traditional materials/ construction methods and 
local manpower.”83 Even though the Norwegians struggled to enforce the inclusion of 
Norwegian goods, it turned out that UNRWA declined the Norwegian produced 
commodities.  
 
The Norwegians also wanted to play a greater role in the organizations and expressed 
their discontent with being underrepresented in terms of high positions in relation to 
the size of their financial contribution.84 When Leif Herheim, a Norwegian, 
consequently assumed the position in UNRWA as main responsible for purchases, one 
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again felt optimistic about import from Norway. It was thus communicated to 
UNRWA that though the MFA was understanding of the political philosophy of the 
organization, they would like Norwegian trade to be considered when goods and 
services were bought in from outside the occupied territories.85  
 
UNRWA finally did show interest for one Norwegian commodity, but it was not 
prefabricated houses or other construction materials as the Norwegians had hoped for. 
In a meeting with Jan Egeland, General Commissioner Ilter Türkmen explained that 
the Norwegian inventor Thor Børresen had developed a technology of irrigation in 
arid areas, which UNRWA wanted to try in Gaza. Later in the same meeting, Egeland 
brought up that the MFA was under strong pressure from the Norwegian Parliament to 
export Norwegian commodities to UNRWA. This time, however, there was no 
mentioning of the construction trade, but instead irrigation technology, hospital 
equipment, etc., that Egeland mentioned to exemplify such export.86 A couple of 
weeks later, the Norwegian Trade Council reported that equipment to the hospital in 
Gaza was to be exported from Norway. Though the Norwegians did not support the 
construction of the hospital in Gaza, they now demonstrated a change of mind through 
the export of medical equipment. In the UN´s 47th general assembly the Nordic 
governments, represented by Norway, praised UNRWA for its work with establishing 
the hospital in Gaza and emphasized the need for further economic assistance in the 
area.87  The irrigation technique invented by Børresen also continued to be of great 
interest to UNRWA. In august 1993, the MFA received various proposals for what the 
earmarked money could fund, in which this technique could be a vital part of the 
project and thus serve Norwegian interests.88  
 
In summary, the Norwegian aid to the Middle East from Israel´s initiation in 1948 
until the Oslo revelation of the Oslo Agreement in 1993 fluctuated in correlation with 
the Norwegian economy. After the Norwegians discovered oil in 1969 the aid to the 
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Middle East increased drastically. This development progressed even further when the 
Norwegians made it an aim to become an international donor worth noticing by 
reaching the UN goal of donating one percent of its GNP. Furthermore, as the 
Norwegians participated in the UNIFIL force in Lebanon, the Norwegian public 
became more knowledgeable about the conflict between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians. Therefore, the political cost of giving aid to the Palestinians was no 
longer as great as it had been when most of the Norwegians, especially the politicians, 
one-sidedly supported the cause of Israel. Other events, such as the 1967 war, the 
Intifada, and the Gulf War also influenced the Norwegian aid to a certain degree, but 
mostly for brief periods. From 1990, the Norwegians felt increasingly unappreciated in 
UNRWA because UNRWA was reluctant to import Norwegian goods and services 
and because the Norwegians held less prominent positions in the organization than 
their contribution called for. One example particularly demonstrates the importance 
placed on import of Norwegians goods by the MFA: The MFA was unwilling to 
support the hospital in Gaza because they considered it Israeli responsibility, as an 
occupier, to carry this financial burden. However, when asked to export medical 
equipment and thus support Norwegian trade, the Norwegians changed their stance on 
the issue. All in all, though the Norwegian aid to the Middle East before 1993 was 
influenced by both internal, domestic circumstances and external, international 
occurrences, it was not tied up to the mere general assumption that money would 
create peace in the Middle East. This assumption, which the overall strategy of 
providing billions of kroners to the Palestinians would be based on, was only born 
after the Oslo Agreement was revealed.  
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Chapter 3: The Norwegian Aid Effort in the Oslo 
Peace Process (1993-1994). 
With the signature of the Oslo Accord in September 1993, Norway experienced one of 
its greatest achievements in foreign policy. Up until this point in time, Norway had 
served as secret mediator in the negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. 
Now, when there was no longer a secret backchannel, but rather an extremely public 
and overwhelming peace process, the big mystery was what role the Norwegians 
should play. The Norwegians were impatient to show their critics that the Oslo 
Agreement was indeed the first step in the right direction for a future solution to the 
conflict and peace in the Middle East. Eager to impress and obtain tangible results, 
Norway undertook the vocation of peacemaker very earnestly.  Consequently, in the 
period between September 1993 and March 1994, the peace process in the Middle East 
officially entered into the Norwegian foreign policy´s main priority and the role as 
donor to the Palestinians grew immensely with this shift of primacies.  
 
The Oslo Agreement  
Already in 1979, Arafat asked Norway to serve as third party in a possible direct 
communication line with the Israelis. He considered Norway a suitable candidate for 
the job because the Norwegians shared a close relationship with both Israel and the 
United States.89 Though the Norwegians were more than willing to undertake such 
important mission, Israel was not equally enthusiastic to communicate directly with 
the PLO, whom they considered terrorists.90 Nevertheless, the MFA, led by Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg, was not easily discouraged and continued to 
try, but got nowhere.  
In 1993, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin agreed to make a careful attempt 
by commissioning two Israeli academics to talk to the PLO. This indirect approach 
would allow him to deny the existence of such direct communication if word of the 
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meetings was revealed.91 At the same time, Terje Rød Larsen, the director of the 
Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science, Fafo, was constructing a research 
project in Gaza and the West Bank. This project was commissioned by the MFA to 
assess the living conditions for the Palestinians. Through the preparations for this 
project, Larsen needed to consult prominent politicians and front figures for the Israeli, 
the Palestinian, and the Norwegian side.92 Consequently, Fafo´s research project was 
recognized as a perfect cover for the secret meetings that would make up the 
backchannel to the official peace process in Washington and then Madrid.93 In January 
1993, Israelis, Palestinian, and Norwegians consequently met in the small town of 
Sarpsborg to explore what direct communication could lead to. As the negotiations in 
the backchannel advanced, representation was taken to a higher and higher level and 
these advances eventually led to the Oslo Agreement.94 
 
The Oslo Agreement consisted of two parts. The first part was the Mutual 
Recognition, in which the PLO acknowledged Israel´s right to exist and Israel 
recognized the PLO as the true representative of the Palestinians. The second part was 
the Declaration of Principles (DoP) —a timetable for the negotiations to take place. 95 
The agreement was thus a mere contract about the headway of the future negotiations 
intended to lead up to a comprehensive agreement. For the following interim period, 
trust was expected to grow between the Israelis and the Palestinians and this would 
enable the adversaries to discuss and establish the difficult questions through an 
incremental approach.96 
 
According to the timetable laid out in the DoP, the Israelis were to withdraw from the 
areas of Gaza and Jericho within four months. An agreement on the practicalities 
surrounding this withdrawal was to be completed within two months.97 Simultaneously 
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with the Israeli retreat, the Palestinians would assume responsibility for its own 
education, culture, social welfare, health, direct taxation and tourism.98 This in turn 
would initiate the interim period of five years, which was to lead up to a permanent 
settlement in thread with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.99 In this interim 
period, the Palestinians were to establish a Self-Government Authority and no later 
than nine months after the DoP became effective, an election of a Council should be 
held for the Palestinian people.100 As the Council was installed, the Palestinians would 
assume power over security in the areas under its jurisdiction and the Palestinian 
Police Force would be replacing the Israeli Military.101 An interim agreement was to 
be negotiated before this in order to further discuss the details concerning this 
transition.102 The Council would extend its jurisdiction over Gaza and the West Bank, 
expect for issues that were to be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.103 
These permanent status negotiations were to be commenced within the third year of 
the interim period and were to cover the core disputes such as the issues of Jerusalem, 
settlements, and refugees.104 
 
The Declaration of Principles included many clauses for the economic development of 
the Palestinians. Issues such as the right to water, cooperation on the exploitation of 
electricity and energy resources, the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank, 
as well as transport and communication lines, particularly between Gaza and the West 
Bank, the establishment of a Gaza Seaport, trade and industry promotion were only 
some of the aspects mentioned to enhance the development of the Palestinian 
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economy.105  In short, though, the mission was to construct a Palestinian autonomous 
area apt to work sufficiently in terms of all state functions and this aspect made the 
peace process laid out in the DoP pretty unique. Through cooperation between the two 
rivals and the donor community, the ultimate aim was to construct a sustainable 
economy for the Palestinians even as negotiations continuously changed the 
framework of the areas that the budget pertained to. Without precedent and without 
any form of political stability this was certainly an ambitious undertaking.106 
 
International Donor Effort in the Dawn of the Peace Process  
The incremental approach, which laid the framework for the Oslo Agreement and 
subsequent peace process, was based on the assumption that trust would grow between 
the two adversaries as negotiations proceeded. The main reason why this trust was 
expected to grow among the Israelis and the Palestinians was that the peace process 
would be underpinned with economic development, which would show the adversaries 
that negotiations towards peace was for the best.107 According to Anne Le More, a 
researcher who has written extensively on aid to the Palestinians, the approach of the 
international society in the aftermath of the Oslo Agreement was “premised upon an 
unsophisticated but common assumption about linear progress between peace, security 
and development.”108  
 
Consequently, after the agreement was revealed to the international community, 
numerous donor countries moved swiftly to mobilize economic support for the peace 
process. In September 1993, a six-volume World Bank (WB) study estimated that 2.4 
billion USD would be needed in the implementation phase that was to take place for 
the next five years.109 Already on October 1, 1993 an international donor conference in 
Washington D.C. assembled 43 donors from all over the world.  Over two billion USD 
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was pledged in financial assistance for the next five years to underpin the peace 
process.110  
 
One month after the Washington Conference, two organizations were established to 
help coordinate the massive aid to the Palestinians: the Ad Hoc Liasion Committee 
and the Consultative Group (CG).111  The AHLC constituted an exclusive group of the 
most essential donors and it was to serve as the principal coordination mechanism for 
the aid to the Palestinians. It was established to “provide overall political guidance for 
the aid process” for the international community of donors.112 Its first formal meeting 
was held already on November 5th in Paris. The CG, a World Bank initiative, was a 
more inclusive group of about 30 countries, which gave the various donors a place to 
present their more technical questions and concerns regarding aid.113 In the AHLC 
meeting in Brussels on November 29,1994 another two bodies were established to 
enhance the coordination of aid: the Local Aid Coordination Committee and the Joint 
Liasion Committee. The purpose of the LACC was to augment coordination at the 
local level and the intended function of the JLC was to overcome problems, which 
could arise in donor-recipient relations.114  
 
Norwegian Role in the International Effort  
As the international donor effort materialized, a strongly competitive relationship 
arose between the United States and the European Union (EU). The aggravated tone 
between the two most important donors was a problem that stained the peace process 
by creating multiple challenges. For the Norwegians, nonetheless, the strained 
relationship between the EU and the United States was beneficial because it gave 
Norway the role as chair of the AHLC. Neither the United States nor the EU would 
accept the other as chair, and Norway thus became a compromise acceptable to them 
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both.115 This secured the Norwegians a prominent role in the peace process and gave 
them the spotlight in the Middle East that they had been wanting for many years.116  
 
The role as chair of the AHLC, in turn, gave Norway other important positions. In the 
LACC, for example, Norway was granted the role as co-chair, together with the World 
Bank and the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process 
(UNSCO). Additionally, the JLC was intended to be an exclusive group restricted to 
LACC co-chairs and the Palestinian National Authority (PA). Norway was thus given 
the role as shepherd, while the Palestinians themselves assumed the position as 
chair.117 The Norwegian responsibility was thus further expanded. 
 
Norwegian Aid to the Middle East  
The Norwegian involvement in the materialization of the Oslo agreement led to a 
strengthened image of Norway as a peace nation, both among the international 
community and within Norway itself. Given this reputation, the little nation was 
willing to go to great lengths, and further than most other donors, to maintain the 
peace in the Middle East and their own novel image as peace builders. Providing aid to 
the Palestinians in the aftermath of the agreement was not only a manner of securing 
the peace process, but it was also great commercial for Norway´s reputation. The West 
Bank and Gaza Strip area was now in the spotlight of attention, both among the 
greatest international actors and in the global media, and this meant that any 
investment provided a “large potential for political returns on aid investments.”118  
 
The general idea internationally, as well as in Norway, was that economic 
development was a prerequisite for peace.119 This assumption led Norway and most 
other donor countries to a rigorous increase of its financial contribution to the West 
Bank and Gaza region. On October 25,1993, a month and a week after the official 
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signature ceremony, Foreign Minister Johan Jørgen Holst presented the Oslo 
Agreement to the Storting. He explained that the reason for the incremental approach 
laid out in the interim agreement was that the situation was not yet sufficiently mature 
to address the key questions in the conflict, such as Jerusalem, the Jewish settlements, 
and the borders. However, he assured the Storting, “the agreement contains decisions 
regarding the development of a close and institutionalized economic and regional 
cooperation. It is expected that this will change the political framework for the 
creation of a state and the integration in the Middle East.”120 This communicated a 
crystal clear message to the representatives of the Storting— if only the economic 
conditions would change, the political situation would be riper for peace. This laid the 
framework for the Norwegian strategy throughout the peace process.  
 
Holst´ plea to the Storting came after great decisions had already been made. An “aid 
package” had been developed few days after the signature ceremony. The aim for this 
package was to “improve living conditions for the Palestinian population and in that 
way contribute to ensure the peace in the Middle East.”121 As soon as September 30, 
1993, the Norwegians had initiated their aid effort by signing an agreement with the 
Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, one of the first Palestinians organizations to be 
established.122 Other already ongoing projects were the support for the Palestinian 
universities, the agricultural irrigation project,123 various consultancy services, and 
Fafo´s social survey on the living conditions in the occupied territories. The aid 
package stipulated increased support for projects intended to ensure the Palestinians´ 
water, houses, a functional sewage system, telecommunication, functional institutions, 
and economic development. In addition, the aid package planned for expanded aid 
channeled through UNRWA and various Palestinian and Norwegian NGOs.124 In the 
Conference for aid to the Middle East in Washington on October 1,1993, Johan Jørgen 
Holst pledged one billion NOK. In his statement to the conference he asserted his faith 
in the correlation between aid and peace: 
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We must seek operational efficiency rather than presentational glory. We must ensure open access 
to decisions. Our efforts should be pooled and coordinated so as to maximize total impact and 
efficiency…On this basis and understanding, I am happy to pledge the sum of 250 million NOK, 
or 35 million USD, over the next twelve months, or in excess of 8 USD from every Norwegian 
citizen per year. This is the handshake of peace from the people of Norway…A light of hope has 
been lit for the children of the Palestinian people. It is up to us to convert promise into reality and 
dream into substance.125 
 
The assumption that aid would make the political situation riper for peace was Holst´s 
main argument when suggesting a drastic increase in financial support to the Middle 
East. Holst informed the members of the Storting that the government proposed to 
donate 250 million NOK to the Palestinians for 1994 and the remaining months of 
1993. Furthermore, granted the approval of the Storting, the government envisioned to 
maintain the aid to the Palestinians at this high level for a five-year period.126 A month 
later, on November 19, 1993 the official petition from the MFA was sent to the 
Storting. The year before the total sum given to the Palestinians had been 65 million 
NOK, and it was now rapidly changed to an annual 250 million NOK.  
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs needed to convince the politicians of this drastic 
change, and they thus promised that this time, Norwegian trade would be involved in 
the international aid projects. The dual aim of foreign aid to the Middle East was 
therefore to extend the infrastructure for the Palestinians in order to show them that 
peace was the better option and combine this with extensive cooperation with 
Norwegian trade.127 In 1994 and in 1995, the importance of supporting Norwegian 
trade was thus emphasized twice in the fiscal budget item concerning aid to the 
Palestinians.128 As the MFA had felt that Norwegian goods and services were 
unappreciated in the period prior to the agreement, there was a lot of pride and prestige 
at stake in this process of the inclusion of Norwegian trade.129 When the Storting 
approved the government´s proposal, it was definite that Norway would give nearly 
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1.3 billion NOK in the five-year time span that the interim period was expected to 
endure.130 This was a direct consequence of the Oslo agreement. 131  
 
Overcoming Challenges in the Start-Up Phase of the Peace Process.  
Even though the donor countries had pledged a great deal of aid to the Palestinians, 
problems soon became evident with the implementation of the aid. On November 5, 
1993 the Norwegians chaired their first AHLC meeting in Paris. Given the timetable 
of the peace process, the donors had specific expectations to what kind of aid would be 
required at the different stages of the peace process. For the initiating phase it was 
anticipated that the Palestinians needed help to establish a sustainable economy while 
they were building bureaucratic bodies to collect tax revenues. Nevertheless, during 
the meeting in Paris most of the donor countries reported that it had proved highly 
complicated to donate untied aid for the next six months. This type of aid was 
untraditional because aid was not normally used to cover such expenses. The donor 
countries thus requested assurances of accountability in order to defend these 
extraordinary contributions at home.132 This proved to be a problem as there were no 
real mechanisms on the Palestinian side to coordinate the aid and enhance 
transparency. Furthermore, none of the institutions that were required to govern an 
autonomous area and its population were in place. In order to start the construction of 
these, it was necessary to have the means to finance them.133 The Norwegians took 
these concerns seriously. As the administrative capacity of the Palestinians had been 
considerably lower than what was necessary, Norway helped construct the Palestinians 
Economic Council for Development and Construction (PECDAR).134 The purpose of 
this organization was to serve as a linkage between donors and the Palestinians by 
mapping donor assistance and distribute aid in accordance with both the needs of the 
Palestinians and the donor countries.135 Johan Jørgen Holst, the Norwegian Foreign 
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Minister, and Arafat created the guiding principles for the organization together.136  
 
Holst also worked intensely to have a fund established that enabled countries to make 
transferals of money to the Palestinian police force easier. Unfortunately, Holst´s work 
for a fund was abruptly interrupted. In January 1994, Holst, who had played a vital 
role in the Oslo Backchannel and the subsequent three months of peace process, died 
as a consequence of a series of strokes.137  Later that same month, the World Bank 
established a fund similar to the one Holst wanted to create. The fund would serve as a 
channel for donor aid designated to the start-up and recurrent expenses of the PA as 
well as expenditures related to the construction of PECDAR. This made transactions 
between the donors and the PA move faster and thus improved the coordination of the 
financial aid to the region. As a guest of honor, the account was named Johan Jørgen 
Holst Peace Fund.138  
 
Even though these changes did serve to improve the coordination of aid from the 
donors to the everyday Palestinian, progress took time. Meanwhile, the lack of visible 
results and the unstable predictions for the future caused a radicalization among the 
Palestinians, which led to increased support for groups that promoted terror attacks 
against the Israelis. The Israelis responded to this growing threat by closing the 
borders and cutting off most traffic between Gaza and Israel. This again caused the 
economy among the Palestinians to further deteriorate as roughly fifty percent of the 
Palestinians working in Israel were prevented from going to work.139 
 
Meanwhile, the negotiations continued. The first agreement on the withdrawal from 
Gaza and Jericho was to be completed by December 13, 1993 according to the DoP. 
The talks were initially held at Taba in Egypt and were open to media coverage. It 
soon became evident, however, that both parties used the media to broadcast the most 
public-friendly versions of their demands and the talks consequently stalemated. The 
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negotiations were therefore moved to a secret location to avoid the publicity around it 
and the two parties made some concessions on both sides in order to resume the 
talks.140  
 
Negotiations were still ongoing, when an incident caused a sudden but definite halt.141 
On February 25, 1994 a Jewish settler massacred Muslim worshippers during the 
morning prayers at Hebron´s Ibrahimiya Mosque. Twenty-nine Palestinians were 
killed and many more wounded. In the subsequent uprising another thirty Palestinians 
were killed by IDF troops and around a hundred were injured.142 When the PLO 
angrily suspended its participation in the negotiations and rioted, this was punished by 
the Israelis with curfews. The PLO demanded that the Israeli settlers were removed 
from Hebron, but Israel´s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin did not accept this, as these in 
his opinion were issues they had established as final issues in the DoP.143   
 
The Israeli unwillingness to make any concessions made it close to impossible for 
Arafat to resume negotiations, as this would cost too much politically. However, Rabin 
did agree to a temporary international observatory presence in the region, something 
the Israelis consistently had denied since 1967.144 Subsequently, on March 31, 1994, 
the Hebron Agreement was signed. Norway assumed the leading role of the 
international presence and contributed 20 million NOK to cover the expenditures. The 
Temporary International Presence in Hebron was initiated in May 1994 and completed 
after three months. Even though the mission was criticized for its devastating lack of 
authority, it served the main purpose of giving Arafat sufficient concessions, if barely, 
to continue the negotiations with some political dignity.145 Thanks to this maneuver, 
the peace process could progress.  
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In March 1994, six months had passed since the Oslo Agreement had started an 
extensive peace process. At this point, it was clear that the Norwegian role in the 
interim period would be more than extensive, especially taken the size of the country 
into consideration. The Norwegians chaired the AHLC, the main mechanism for 
coordinating aid to the Palestinians. This role gave them considerable power 
concerning the coordination process, especially since the EU and the United States 
disagreed on many issues. Furthermore, the role as chair of the donor group 
automatically made them chair of the LACC, members of the CG and the JLC groups. 
In addition, the Norwegians were leading the TIPH mission and the Coordinating 
Committee of International Assistance to the Palestinian Police Force (COPP).146 They 
were one of the key initiators in developing Palestinian institutions such as PECDAR 
and the Holst Fund.147 Financially, the Norwegians had invested considerably to be a 
good supporter of the Declaration of Principles. Through their involvement and 
extensive aid effort to the Palestinians, the Norwegians showed their willingness to go 
to great lengths, and further than most other, in order to support the peace process in 
the Middle East.  
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Chapter 4: No Problems, Only Solutions (1994-1995)  
Much was at stake for the Norwegians as the peace process advanced. Not only was 
the outcome of the peace process important for Norway´s new reputation as a peace 
nation, the Norwegians also took the role as chair of the AHLC very seriously. Their 
main strategy was to do what the job called for by putting in their full effort to ensure 
that the Palestinian economy developed in a positive direction. Even though the 
Palestinians by May 1994 had a considerably improved apparatus for receiving aid, 
many challenges arose that few had predicted. While many of the other donor 
countries were reluctant to support a former terrorist group without assurance in 
demands of transparency and accountability that were still often impossible for the 
Palestinians to redeem, the Norwegians took a chance and did what the other donor 
countries had not dared to do. The Norwegians consistently tried to undermine the 
rigid stance of the other donor countries through innovative solutions and allocation of 
its own aid. However, even though the Norwegians did what they could to ensure 
economic progress amongst the Palestinians, challenges continued to arise. Money 
alone simply did not make the political situation riper for peace.148 Nonetheless, as the 
Cairo Agreement set the first phase of the Oslo Agreement into action, Norway 
invested immensely in making sure that the Palestinian self-rule was not hindered by 
economic reasons.149  
 
The Cairo Agreement 
In Cairo, on May 4, 1994, the PLO and Israel signed an agreement containing a 
framework for the Israeli withdrawal and consequent implementation of Palestinian 
self-rule in Gaza and Jericho. The Cairo Agreement incorporated the Paris Protocol, an 
agreement signed in Paris on April 29, 1994 on economic relations between Israel and 
the PA.150 Subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, the transfer of power would proceed 
in three stages: first, in the five spheres tourism, taxation, social welfare, health, and 
culture, then, by the Israelis redeploying their forces from the Palestinian populated 
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centers, finally, by an election of a new governmental body that would represent and 
govern the Palestinian people.151   
 
In accordance with the steps laid out in the Cairo Agreement, the Palestinian Authority 
was established and the IDF withdrew from Gaza and Jericho.152 On June 1, following 
the Paris Protocol, the Israelis ceased the payments to the central administration of the 
Palestinians and the PA was left with the responsibility of covering their wages. The 
Norwegians worried that this would cause considerable economic problems for the 
Palestinians for the upcoming three or four months.153 As Chair of the AHLC, Norway 
thus invited the donor countries in the committee to the second meeting of the AHLC 
in Paris on June 9-10, 1994. Jan Egeland, who chaired the AHLC meetings, opened 
the Paris Conference by reestablishing the assumption of the correlation between aid 
and peace: ”It is now more important than ever for us around this table to underpin the 
peace process by concrete financial measures- or the peace process may very well fall 
apart.”154 
 
In order to be viewed as a legitimate chair of the AHLC, Norway wanted and needed 
other countries to look upon Norway as an exemplary donor to the Palestinians. Out of 
all the donor countries, Norway therefore gave the highest percentage of their GNP.155 
The purpose of setting a high standard for the other member countries was one of the 
main reasons why Norway usually pledged additional assistance to the Palestinians in 
the AHLC meetings.156 It was typically elaborated how much or by what priorities 
Norway intended to pledge aid in the upcoming meeting already in the invitations to 
the AHLC meetings sent out by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the 
invitation to the AHLC meeting of June 9, 1994, for example, Foreign Minister Bjørn 
Tore Godal emphasized that Norway had adopted the burden sharing formula so as to 
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encourage the other donor countries to do the same thing.157 The merging of the role as 
coordinator with the role as donor was a strategic choice intended to show the other 
donor countries that Norway did in practice what it preached in theory.   
 
Financing the Palestinian Police Force (PPF) 
In the AHLC meeting, Norway was particularly concerned with financial coverage for 
the Palestinian Police Force. Financing the PPF was problematic, as the donor society 
was highly reluctant to financially assist the construction of a police force for PLO, a 
former terrorist organization.158 Nonetheless, it was part of the Oslo Agreement and 
the subsequent Cairo Agreement that the Palestinians were required and entitled to 
have an own police force.159 This was the reason why Norway had stepped in and 
assumed the responsibility of both coordinating means for the force and financing the 
transition period until the donor society was more willing to donate to the PPF.160 In 
the very beginning of the implementation of the peace process Foreign Minister Holst 
and his companions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had played a key role in 
assisting with setting up and establishing a structure for aid to the PPF. On December 
20, 1993 Norway organized a police donor meeting in Oslo intended to find ways and 
means to finance the PPF. Nevertheless, only Norway and Japan had committed 
themselves to giving money, which was far from solving the problem of financing the 
police force. Since the Cairo Agreement negotiations were coming to a conclusion and 
the need for the PPF to be operational thus became more acute, Norway invited the 
donor countries to an emergency meeting in Cairo on March 24, 1993.161 In this 
meeting a Coordinating Committee of International Assistance to the Palestinian 
Police Force was established.162 Norway had proposed itself as both chair and 
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secretariat of the newly established committee, something that both the United States 
and the PLO had cherished and Norway thus became chair of the COPP.163 
Throughout the year 1994, 16 million NOK was disbursed to COPP.164 
 
After the Cairo Agreement became a fact, the main problem was still to establish a 
safe channel through which the donors could donate money to the PPF without 
running a too high political cost. None of the multinational organizations wanted to 
establish and serve as guarantor for an international channel that enabled the donor 
countries to transfer money to the PPF. In preparation for the upcoming AHLC 
meeting, Ambassador Per Haugestad had written with concern to the MFA. The World 
Bank had recently denied incorporating the budget for the Palestinian Police Force 
into the Holst Fund. In other words, though the donor countries would contribute 
enough to reach the aim of getting 100 million USD in the Holst Fund, this would not 
save the PPF.165 The ambassador´s concern would prove correct—the AHLC meeting 
on June 9th gathered 45 million USD, yet none of this was to be given to the police.166  
 
In September, the Norwegians’ extensive effort finally resulted in an acceptable 
arrangement to channel money to the PPF. UNRWA would serve as a temporary 
“emergency measure” through which the donor community could transfer aid to the 
PPF from May through October 1994.167 As time passed, the emergency mechanism 
set up through UNRWA turned into the permanent solution.168A press release 
emphasized to the Norwegian public that Norway had carried most of the 
responsibility for coordinating the aid to the PPF until this point.169  
 
                                                
163 Lia, Building Arafat´s Police, 44. 
164 MFA AHLC 308.82 (5), Note, January 11, 1995.  
165 MFA AHLC 308.82 (1), Ambassador Per Haugestad to MFA, June 2, 1994.  
166 MFA AHLC 308.82 (2), Note, June 16, 1994.  
167 MFA AHLC 308.82 (3), Press Release, September 15, 1994.  
168 Lia, Building Arafat´s Police, 128. 
169 MFA AHLC 308.82 (3), Press Release, September 15, 1994.  
	   	   	  
	   	   	  	  
39	  
 
The Oslo Declaration 
In June, Arafat asked Godal to pass on a message to Warren Minor Christopher, the 
American Secretary of State. The World Bank had informed Arafat of the sum 
intended to covering running expenditures and Arafat thought this price was too high. 
He felt betrayed by the bank and the donor society. He could not return to Gaza 
without money to pay his people, yet it was not an option to tell them that there was no 
money when the Holst fund contained 54 million USD.170  
 
Godal did send a letter, but Christopher partially passed the ball back to the 
Norwegians. On August 8, Christopher replied to Godal by urging Norway, as chair of 
the AHLC, to get a move on transforming pledges made a year earlier into real money 
and changes on the ground.171  Nevertheless, when Arafat had decided to delay his 
return to Gaza in protest few weeks earlier, Christopher Warren had indeed intervened 
and emphasized to Arafat the contingency between American aid and Arafat´s 
return.172 On July 1, 1994 Arafat set foot in Gaza for the first time since 1967.173 
 
The staff in the MFA took the response from Christopher quite seriously. In a high-
level meeting, it was commonly interpreted that the international community was 
searching for someone to assign the responsibility for the slow disbursement of 
money. To avoid being the one blamed for this problem, Norway needed to step things 
up and show that they were making an extraordinary effort to improve the situation. 
Furthermore, it was of utmost importance that the next AHLC meeting was arranged 
as soon as possible after the upcoming CG-meeting and preferably as early as 
September.174  
 
Things were not to proceed as the Norwegians planned, however. The CG meeting that 
was to take place in Paris from the 8th to the 9th of September was cancelled in the 
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morning because of political disagreement between the PLO and Israel over a 
reference to Jerusalem in the documentation provided by the PLO to the meeting.175 
This was similar to a situation that had occurred two months earlier, when the AHLC 
meeting on June 9th had been dominated by the dispute between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians over a reference to Jerusalem as the base of PECDAR. That time a threat 
of walk out by the Israelis had been averted, but just barely.176  
 
It now became evident to the MFA that something needed to be done before another 
donor meeting could be assembled. The Norwegians realized that the next time Arafat 
and Shimon Peres, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, were united, was the one-
year celebration of the Oslo Agreement to be held in Oslo on September 13, 1994. 
This was a good opportunity to bring the adversaries together, get the process back on 
track, and avoid that the crisis of the CG meeting would be allowed to dominate for 
too long. The aim for this meeting in Norway was to work on the transition to Early 
Empowerment, its consequences for the budget, and the PPF.177 The meeting focused 
on the mechanism for the police that still was not in place and the creation of a 
tripartite agreement between Israel, the PLO and the donor community. In addition to 
discussing the peculiarities of the economic development, Peres and Godal had a 
meeting in which they agreed to make a commission consisting of three 
representatives: one from PLO, one from Israel and one from Norway. These would 
work out a declaration containing a solution to the problems that had caused the CG 
meeting to be cancelled.178 With help from Godal, the commission did manage to 
reach a declaration in which Israel and the PLO agreed to “accept the request by the 
AHLC chairman that they shall not bring before the donor community those political 
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issues that are of disagreement between them”.179 The Norwegians considered the Oslo 
Declaration a “major breakthrough” as it allowed the aid effort to continue 
independently of the political disagreements between the two adversaries.180 Warren 
Christopher congratulated Godal and his staff for achieving to create a declaration that 
settled the problems that arose on the CG meeting.181 Nonetheless, while the 
commitment to abstain from referring to political disagreements when discussing aid 
was necessary, it complicated communication, which made the role as coordinator 
further challenging.  
 
Steps to Deal with the Problem of Slow Disbursement 
As the Oslo Declaration allowed the aid effort to continue, the issue of slow 
disbursement became the hot topic of the peace process. In an interview with the 
Financial Times, Terje Rød Larsen, in the capacity of his new job as the first UN 
Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, made the following statement: “the 
donor effort is a failure. The strategy [is] wrong, the timetable [is] wrong and the 
priorities [are] wrong.” 182 Below the interview sent to the MFA a handwritten note by 
Ambassador Truls Hanevold sarcastically commented: “isn’t that what he has been 
employed to do something about?” Larsen complained in the interview that only 140 
million USD out of a pledged 700 million USD had been disbursed. The only project, 
according to Larsen, that had actually succeeded in having a positive effect was the 
Clean-Up-Gaza.183 This project, which was organized by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and co-founded by Norway and Japan, basically 
hired Palestinians to clean up Gaza.184 As was the case in most of the employment 
generating programs in the Palestinian Areas, the wage that was given each individual 
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was below average, in order to avoid exploitation by those who were not poor.185 In 
1994, this project provided work for 4000 Palestinians in Gaza and it thus succeeded 
in reaching many families in an efficient way and create utile labor that benefitted the 
whole area.186  
 
The third official AHLC meeting that was supposed to be held immediately after the 
failed CG meeting in the beginning of September did not take place before 29th and 
30th of November. The meeting was set in Brussels and the aim for the meeting was to 
acquire 145 million USD. This high number, which made many of the representatives 
from the European countries raise their eyebrows, was agreed upon in exclusive 
negotiations between the Americans and the Palestinians. The sum was meant to cover 
the shortage of funds for the period October 1, 1994 till March 31, 1995, which was 
considered the remaining period of Early Empowerment.187 
 
The AHLC meeting went better than Norway had predicted. Out of the 145 million 
USD needed, 102 million USD was pledged. Even though this was better than 
expected, it also meant that 43 million USD was still needed just to cover the 
estimated budget deficit of the PA. As was always the case with the AHLC meetings, 
Norway intended to serve as example for the other donor countries. 13 million out of 
the 102 million USD pledged were made by Norway itself. They pledged three million 
USD to the PPF and ten million USD to Immediate Action in Gaza, which was 
intended to be a follow up to the successful Clean Up Gaza. The project was supposed 
to continue for five years and employ 5000 people. 188 The aim was to improve 
neighborhoods, green spaces, and children´s playgrounds. This was no ordinary 
development programme and Norway was later criticized for using such vast resources 
on a cosmetic work-generating project, which only helped the economy for a short 
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period.189 This particular project was chosen because Clean Up Gaza had worked so 
well in terms of distributing money quickly, and it showed that Norway made an effort 
to disburse its pledges in an efficient manner.190  
 
The transitions from pledged to implemented money, and from implemented to 
disbursed money continued to be a challenge for the Norwegians. This was 
emphasized to the Norwegians when they already in December transferred three 
million USD of their new pledges to PECDAR, the organization established to deal 
with international aid, and PECDAR only accomplished to implement 18 000 USD on 
the ground. This showed the Norwegians that not only was there a problem of making 
the donor countries realize their pledges into actual aid, but there was still insufficient 
resources on the recipient side to implement the money and a lack of coordination 
locally.191 
 
The Honorable and Challenging Position in the Middle of the EU and the 
United States. 
In the preparation period before the AHLC meeting, the conflict between the European 
Union and the Americans became stronger. The EU thought the United States acted as 
though it owned the peace process, even though the EU was the biggest donor of aid to 
the Middle East. Furthermore, in a EU meeting, the French were of the opinion that 
the Israelis and the Americans cooperated to exaggerate the unemployment problem of 
the Palestinians living in the occupied territories so as to have the Europeans cover the 
budget gap caused by the Israeli closure of borders.192  The Americans did little to 
dispute these accusations. In fact, before the AHLC meeting to be held in Europe, the 
Americans sent out a demarche requesting all countries to provide surveys of their 
financial aid to the Palestinians, even Norway was requested to present this overview. 
As Norway was chair of the AHLC, the MFA felt that they should have been the ones 
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sending out such documents.193 In order to keep the donor assistance on track, a great 
part of the Norwegian job was to negotiate between the EU and the United States. It 
was therefore important in the role as chair of the AHLC to appear impartial. By 
overturning Norway, Americans to some degree disregarded the Norwegian authority 
and made it harder to refute the EU´s accusation that Norway served secondary to the 
Americans.194 Eventually, the MFA found that the easiest way to work with the United 
States and accomplish the tasks at hand was by simply allowing the United States to 
assume the leading role.195 
 
As the historic peace process progressed, the aid coordination role in the midst of the 
quarrel between the EU and the United States became increasingly difficult for 
Norway. The donors wanted something in return for their contributions. In similarity 
with Norway, all of the AHLC member nations wanted to play a role in the 
coordinating process to which most donors now gave major donations. Particularly, 
the EU felt that there was no correlation between the money they put in and the 
political role they were handed to play in the whole process.  
 
This was further exacerbated when the Norwegian Nobel Committee in December 
1994, granted the peace prize to the leading men in the Middle East: Rabin, Peres, and 
Arafat.196 The MFA used the convenient occasion of having all the chairmen gathered 
in Oslo to establish the Trilateral Commission (TC), which was to serve as a space 
where the Israelis and the Palestinians could raise questions concerning aid. The donor 
countries would be represented in the same way that they were represented in the JLC, 
through Norway, the WB and UNSCO.197  
 
This decision was not acceptable to the EU, which had already been offended that they 
were not to be members in the JLC and then only got to hear about the decision about 
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the commission after it had already been established. Sven Svedman, the Norwegian 
chair of the LACC and the ambassador at the embassy of Tel Aviv, ensured the French 
representative for the EU, the Consul General in Jerusalem, that they would be well 
represented through the Norwegians. The French representative responded that Paris 
was about to demarche for the chair of the AHLC about the EU participating in the 
TC.198  When Uri Savir, the Chief Negotiator of the Oslo Accords and the Director-
General in the Israeli MFA, was informed about the EU´s reaction, he encouraged 
Svedman to remember that it was against the nature of the peace process to come up 
with new structures in unofficial meetings. Moreover, he thought the Norwegians 
should consider how it would influence the whole donor process if one dogmatically 
kept solutions that caused the EU to go separate ways and contribute less in the donor 
meetings. 199   
 
This caused a difficult dilemma for the Norwegians. On one hand, Norway wanted the 
countries to donate as much money as possible, yet on the other hand it was in 
Norwegian interest to keep the prominent role they played in the peace process.200 
“We are forced to relate to the fact that the EU is the greatest donor”, Svedman wrote 
to the MFA “yet at the same time it is possible that the EU may interpret a concession 
from our side to set in new advances to assume the position as chair of the AHLC.”201 
In an attempt to deal with the issue, Ambassador Rolf Trolle Andersen met with Jean-
Luc Sibiude, the EU chair´s Middle East coordinator. Andersen argued that it was 
important to remember that the exclusive representation in the TC was to ensure faster 
and more efficient communication coordination of the aid to the Palestinians, but to no 
avail. Sibiude had been instructed to inform the Norwegians that the EU´s 
disgruntlement about the established mechanisms for local coordination was about to 
reach the presidency of the EU. As the greatest donor, the EU raised questions as to 
whether the best representation of the donors was by the three meant to represent them 
in the TC and JLC. In Sibiude´s opinion, the situation on the donor side locally had 
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become so edgy that it reminded of ”guerilla warfare”.202  Shortly after, the EU and the 
United States were granted membership in the TC.203  Furthermore, in the next AHLC 
meeting, the JLC too was extended to include the United States and the EU, with 
Norway as Shepherd.204 
 
Economic and Political Crisis Causes Norway to Step it Up 
By February 1995, the situation between the Israelis and the Palestinians was in crisis 
both economically and politically. The frequency of terrorist attacks had increased 
drastically and many Israelis felt that Rabin and Peres had failed, as the peace process 
did not lead to reduced terrorism.205 In an LACC meeting in February 1995, Arafat 
reported that the Israeli border closures and the lack of Israeli transfer of tax money 
entitled to the Palestinians had brought the peace process entirely to a halt. One of the 
side effects of the closures was that 50-60 000 Palestinians were left without a job. 
The total cost of the Israeli border closures was calculated to USD two million per 
day. Svedman aggregated that the donor process, too, was in deep trouble, which 
further exacerbated the overall picture of the situation.206 
 
With the peace process moving in a negative direction, the prestigious undertaking of 
collecting aid to the Middle East was a heavier responsibility than ever before. 
Svedman reported home that because the problems were so great, the MFA needed to 
run the coordination effort forward with great engagement and speed, and distribute 
the responsibility on as many donor countries and organizations as possible. One could 
already trace hints of repudiation of responsibility and “blame sharing” that needed to 
be worked against by engaging all donor countries actively in the LACC process.207 
This demonstrated a major shift in the Norwegian attitude towards the responsibility of 
coordinating the aid to the Palestinians. The role as chair for the AHLC was originally 
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intended to be a rotating role.208 At this point, the MFA thought it necessary to 
consider whether the role should be passed on. Even though there seemed to be 
satisfaction as to how the Norwegians performed their role, the position included such 
“great costs” that it was still natural to consider the future. The assessment of the 
Norwegian role concluded that “even though it would be close to impossible to find 
someone to take over the role, this should not be of hindrance to communicate a 
political wish to change. If we chose an active role we have to be prepared to carry the 
responsibility, meaning political engagement and increased weight on the government, 
including the Prime Minister.”209 Nonetheless, instead of passing on the role as chair 
of the AHLC, the Norwegians stepped up their effort. “As chair of the AHLC, we 
carry the responsibility to find solutions to these acute problems that are rising” wrote 
Ambassador Andersen from the embassy in Tel Aviv.210  
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Chapter 5: Norway Leads by Example (1995- 1997) 
To find a solution to the Palestinian economy, which appeared bleaker and bleaker for 
each day, became more difficult as the peace process kept moving in a negative 
direction. The numerous suicide attacks carried out by militant Palestinians caused the 
Israelis to close the borders. Consequently, the Palestinians who worked in Israel were 
prevented from going to work and unemployment increased sharply among the 
Palestinians.211 Furthermore, the projects that were implemented in Gaza and in the 
West Bank did not receive the revenues required to proceed.212 The cost of the Israeli 
closure of two million USD per day eventually reached a sum that exceeded the 
aggregate amount of international assistance committed for 1994.213 Moreover, the 
price of the border closures was higher than the donors could ever compensate.214  
 
The preparations for the AHLC meeting to be held in April 1995 in Paris clearly 
demonstrated the severity of the financial problems to the Norwegians. The absolute 
minimum stipulated budget deficit of the Palestinians was 136 million USD—a sum 
that was still so high that it was clearly unrealistic for the donors to cover the whole 
sum.215 The Norwegians expected that donors would not be able to pledge more than 
sixty million USD and with one million in the Holst Fund this caused reason to worry. 
At the same time, the donors were growing tired of pledging aid to the Holst Fund 
which covered the running expenditures, because this money went straight into 
covering the consequences of the Israelis closing their borders and not for long-term 
development purposes.216  At the outset of the peace process, the donor countries had 
been informed that it was unlikely that the need for budgetary support would continue 
beyond 1994, and the donor countries had planned accordingly.217 
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In the AHLC meeting in Brussels on November 29-30, 1994, the Palestinians and 
Norway, in its capacity as chair of the AHLC, had made an agreement named “The 
Understanding on Revenues, Expenditures and Donor Funding for the Palestinian 
Authority.”218 One of the conditions in this agreement had been that the Palestinian 
budget should have been in balance by March 1995.219 Consequently, most donor 
countries had planned to contribute primarily long-term development aid after March. 
By March, however, it was evident that commitments undertaken in the Brussels 
agreement could not be completed.220 While the United States was increasingly 
disturbed with the fact that this still was not the case, the Europeans showed 
considerable patience and understanding, and were even requesting stipulated deficits 
to be calculated for the budget year 1996-7 too, in order to commence preparations. 
The MFA considered their own approach closer to the American approach and they 
were of the opinion that the Palestinians needed to portray more budget discipline and 
cooperation about taxation and expenditures.221  
 
Despite criticism, most donors did not see it as an option to downsize the economic 
assistance to the Palestinians in times when their economies were deteriorating.222 This 
was particularly the case for Norway, as their role as chair of the AHLC would be 
increasingly challenging if donor countries did not maintain the high level of 
assistance. It was thus even more important than in the initiating phase for Norway to 
set an example and keep positive. Norway thus increased its total contribution because 
they considered it fatal for Norway, as chair, to point to own effort to solve the 
problems before requesting that the other donor countries increased their financial aid 
to the Palestinians.223 The situation was thus quite predetermined for the Norwegians 
in the sense that there were few realistic choices beyond increasing the level of aid as 
the Palestinian economy deteriorated.224 Norway thus allocated 35 million NOK to be 
pledged in the AHLC meeting for the Holst Fund, which constituted four percent of 
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the stipulated Palestinian budget deficit. This sum brought the total Norwegian 
contribution thus far in 1995 to 383 million NOK, which was a steep increase from the 
257 million donated in 1994.225 This sum was considerably higher than the 250 million 
NOK that Norway had planned to donate annually in the Washington Conference in 
1993. Granted the size of the contribution, Foreign Minister Godal therefore had to 
defend this expansion for the Committee of Foreign Affairs in the Storting. Norway, as 
chair of the AHLC, had a responsibility to mobilize money from the donors to the 
budget and to the police, he explained, before assuring the committee that from 1996, 
Norway would indeed phase out the budget support and support for emergency causes 
and concentrate on more long-term projects.226  
 
The responsibility to mobilize money was no easy task when the budget was in crisis 
and the donors were tired of giving. The MFA considered it vital to get out of what 
they coined the last-minute-pledging syndrome and the Foreign Minister ensured in an 
interview that the AHLC meeting in Paris would be the last emergency summit to be 
held.227 Furthermore, during the meeting in Paris, the “Tripartite Action Plan on 
Revenues, Expenditures, and Donor Funding for the Palestinian Authority” (TAP) of 
April 1995 was made between the two adversaries and the donors. This agreement 
opened for the possibility that budget support could be necessary in 1996 too, but that 
it would not be possible to extend this beyond 1996.228 The TAP was signed by 
Norway on behalf of the donor countries.229 
 
As the MFA had expected, though 136 million USD was required to cover the 
estimated budget deficit, only approximately 60 million USD was pledged during the 
meeting. Moreover, by May 1995, it was clear that the donors were not able to cover 
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the stipulated budget deficits, and the aid effort was in its greatest crisis thus far in the 
peace process.  
 
Oslo II 
Towards the end of September, a finalization in the negotiations between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis served to mitigate the economic crisis. Oslo II was the 
main interim agreement and was signed by Rabin, Peres, and Arafat in Washington on 
September 28, 1995. In accordance with the stipulations of the DoP, this agreement 
contained a road map for further Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, the details for 
the upcoming Palestinian election, and arrangements to sort out the situation in Hebron 
and the safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank.230  
 
One part of the second interim agreement carried particular importance for Norway: 
the section about the People-to-People Programme (P2P).231 The P2P was an inter-
communication programme intended to enhance communication between the Israelis 
and the Palestinians, and hence public support for the Oslo Process. The wording of 
the accord specified that Norway would develop the structure of the P2P, which served 
to further emphasize the Norwegian importance in the peace process and thus, as far as 
the MFA was concerned, serve Norwegian interest.232  
 
In general, the way the agreement split the Palestinian areas, particularly within the 
West Bank, caused considerable practical challenges for the implementation of the 
donor projects.233 Article XI in the Oslo II Agreement split the areas in the West Bank 
into three types of areas; A, B and C. 234  Area A were areas densely populated by 
Palestinians, area B were areas less densely populated, and area C was the land 
confiscated by Israel for settlement, roads, and military. Areas type A was placed 
under Palestinian jurisdiction while areas type C were subject to Israeli jurisdiction. 
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Areas pertaining to type B were under Palestinian civil jurisdiction, but they too, were 
subject to Israeli jurisdiction as far as security was concerned. In Gaza, Israel remained 
in control over the settlement areas and their pertaining roads, which made up 
approximately 35 percent of the Gaza Strip, while the rest was given to Palestinians. 
This arrangement caused political challenges for both sides. On the Israeli sides the 
right-wing devotees saw their dream of an undivided Israel being destroyed while on 
the Palestinian side many felt that too many concessions were given in exchange for 
too little land. Extremists’ responses on both sides created serious impediments for the 
implementation of the peace process.235  
 
Not withstanding the obstacles, Oslo II definitely was an agreement and in itself the 
progress needed for the donor effort to gain momentum again. From having held many 
emergency meetings primarily concerned with saving the Palestinian budget crises, the 
Norwegians now wanted to exploit this momentum for all it was worth. Shortly after 
the signing ceremony three important meetings were therefore held: an informal 
AHLC meeting in Washington, a Consultative Group meeting, and finally a new big 
donor conference in Paris. These three meetings were preparations for what was 
coined the “Second Phase of Assistance to the Palestinian people”.236 The new phase, 
it was agreed among the main donor countries, was to concentrate more on long-term 
aid in the form of project support and to a lesser degree on running expenditures to the 
Palestinian Authority covered by the Holst Fund.237  The World Bank and the UNSCO 
thus prepared sixteen sectors/projects for the donors, prioritized according to need for 
implementation.238 In order to implement this phase-two package, 550 million USD 
was required.239  
 
Optimism reached a new high point in the Norwegian MFA, when the total aid 
pledged in the donor society reached far above what they had expected and the peace 
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process was moving in the right direction.240 Considering the problems that the 
Norwegians had faced while collecting aid to cover the estimated budget deficit before 
Oslo II, the MFA had not been able to understand how the donor countries could 
possibly be able to cover the running expenditures and additionally be able to 
implement the project package prepared by the World Bank and UNSCO. As chair of 
the AHLC, the Norwegians saw it as their prime responsibility to ensure that there was 
enough aid to carry out an optimal aid effort, both in terms of budget support and plan 
support, and this concern had therefore given them considerable headache.241 
Nevertheless, in the AHLC meeting in Washington it became clear that the estimated 
budget deficits for the 1995 budget was decreased from 228 million USD to 101 
million USD and that the prospects for deficits were expected to be depleted by 1997. 
The reason why the estimated deficits were decreased was that the Israelis had been 
able to transfer collected tax revenues more efficiently than before and that the 
Palestinians had improved their own tax collecting systems.242 Furthermore, in the 
Paris Donor Conference on January 9, 1996 the donor community pledged 856 million 
USD, this came in addition to the previously committed 500 million USD for the 
WB/UNSCO projects, and the total collected revenues for the Palestinians reached 1.3 
billion USD.243 When the Palestinian election occurred without major problems two 
weeks later, on January 21, 1996, the Norwegians considered it a major success.244  
 
Vicious Cycle 
Unfortunately, on November 4, 1995 the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin served to 
destabilize the fragile situation in the Middle East and thus the Norwegian optimism. 
Though the Israeli Prime Minister was killed by an Israeli fanatic and nationalistic Jew 
and not by a Palestinian, the future of the peace process without Rabin was highly 
uncertain.245 Shimon Peres, the Foreign Minister, assumed the Prime Minister position 
subsequent to Rabin´s death. But Peres did not enjoy the same public trust among the 
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Israeli people and did not manage to sway public opinion in the way that Rabin had 
done.246 
 
Moreover, despite the recently signed interim agreement, the situation between the 
adversaries was far from peaceful. The expansion of the Israeli settlements on the 
territories pertaining to the Palestinians continued. Settlers controlled one third of the 
land in Gaza and three quarter of the land in the West Bank. In both areas the Israelis 
were in control of the scarce water resources.247 Furthermore, in October 1995, on 
orders from Peres, the Israelis killed the leader of Islamic Jihad, a Palestinian militant 
group, and in January 1996, the chief bomb maker of Hamas, another Islamic and 
militant group, was assassinated. The two groups cooperated to make their retaliation 
more forceful and launched a series of terror attacks throughout the year 1996.248 The 
cost of the frequent border closures of the borders that followed the terror attacks far 
exceeded the number pledged as a result of the interim agreement and caused the 
Palestinian economy to further deteriorate. According to David Makovsky, author of 
the book Making Peace with the PLO, the donors had understood by the spring of 
1995 that the “key premise of Oslo - that economic development equals security - had 
proven difficult to realize.”249 
 
Norwegian Aid to the Middle East is Assessed  
In the shift between 1995 and 1996, the Norwegian donor assistance had to be 
assessed. As a result of the consistent rise in the level of Norwegian aid, the whole one 
billion NOK pledged in 1993 would be spent by the end of 1996, two years earlier 
than planned for. By this point, 188 million NOK had been disbursed in 1994, 340 
million NOK had been disbursed in 1995 and 1996, in addition to 100 million NOK 
paid to the Holst Fund since 1993.250 As the pledged one billion was pledged for a 
five-year period, the MFA decided to only evaluate whether or not to continue this 
high level of financial aid until the end of 1999. In 1998, a comprehensive assessment 
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was planned in accordance with the original time period intended for the one billion 
NOK pledged. The question in 1996 was thus whether to continue the high level that 
the aid had come to by 1996 or whether to downsize it.251  
 
The assessment concluded in a decision to maintain the high level of aid, but to shift 
priorities to more long-term financial aid. This was in thread with the decisions agreed 
upon amongst the donors in the AHLC meeting in Washington on September 28, 
1995.252 The Norwegians continued to use the role as donor as a supplement to their 
role as chief coordinator for the AHLC. It was of utmost importance for the 
Norwegian interest of maintaining a high profile in the Middle East, that the role as 
chair of the AHLC was given a prominent place by the donor community. This was 
always a concern for the Norwegians, but less so in the aftermath of the Oslo II 
agreement than earlier in the peace process. The reason was that the Norwegians 
considered themselves undisputed leaders of the AHLC because no one else was able 
to take over their role. Accordingly, the Norwegians no longer saw a particular need to 
make an exceptional contribution to the Palestinians, only one that reflected their 
special interests and responsibility in the AHLC, but no more than this. Ambassador 
Svedman concluded this in the following manner: “our position in the region is 
secured even without extraordinary new commitments, partially because no one can 
take over our role.”253 Nevertheless, to be on the safe side, the Norwegians still 
pledged two million USD to the Holst Fund as an emergency contribution and 38 
million USD to the World Bank/UNSCO projects in the Paris Conference.254 
 
The incremental nature of the peace process, made it close to impossible to plan long-
term which was problematic when donor countries wanted the move on to long-term 
aid.255 As a donor, the Norwegians were as interested as other donor countries in 
                                                                                                                                                   
250 MFA AHLC 308.82, 1996/00222 (1), MFA to the German Embassy in Oslo, March 15, 1996. 
251 AHLC 308.82, 1995/01332 (3), Note, December 7,1995. 
252 AHLC 308.82, 1995/01332 (3), Note, December 7,1995. 
253 MFA AHLC 308.82, 1996/00222 (1), Tel Aviv to MFA, March 19, 1996.  
254 MFA AHLC 308.82, 1996/00222 (1), MFA to the German Embassy in Oslo, March 15, 1996. 
255 Brynen, A Very Political Economy, 121. 
	   	   	  
	   	   	  	  
56	  
 
giving more project aid than budget aid.256 As the chair of the AHLC, however, the 
MFA was concerned with covering the recurrent budget. Despite decisions and 
promises to the Storting to prioritize long-term aid, the NORAD annual report of 1996 
concluded by the end of the year that the border closures had led a considerable share 
of Norwegian foreign aid to be inserted into short term projects.257   
 
Likud Takes Over  
Shimon Peres made many choices throughout his short period as Prime Minister, 
which led him to grow less popular among the Israeli population. He had given 
permission to shoot the “Engineer” of Hamas, which resulted in brutal vengeance 
attacks against the Israelis. In fear of appearing weak for an Israeli population who 
expected retaliation for these attacks, he launched Operation Grapes of Wrath and 
invaded southern Lebanon. Through this undertaking he had intended to enhance 
security by pushing guerillas fighting for the Lebanese militant group Hizbullah away 
from the Israeli border. What he actually achieved, however, was that countries all 
around the world condemned the invasion of Lebanon and the operation led to less 
rather than more security for the Israelis and hence less Israeli support for Peres as 
Prime Minister.258 
 
Well aware of this development, the Norwegians paid close attention to the election in 
May 1996. This was the same month that was set as deadline for the initiation of the 
final status negotiations in the DoP, but the peace process was far behind schedule. 
Binyamin Netanyahu, the leader of Likud, won the election by small margins and 
assumed the position as Prime Minister in June. This shift of governments to a 
political party that based most of its ideology in a strict interpretation of Zionism was a 
hard stroke for the already fragile peace process.259 Netanyahu himself came from a 
background that did not recognize the Palestinians´ right to national self-determination 
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and who considered the whole Land of Israel as entitled to the Jewish people alone.260 
According to Netanyahu, the creation of the Oslo Agreement had been a violation of 
the Jew´s historic right to a united and great Israel.261 Nevertheless, before the election 
he had recognized that most Israelis supported the peace process, and consequently 
changed his approach and rhetoric. Hence, his main slogan throughout the buildup to 
the election was that while the Labor Party had created peace without security, he 
intended to make peace with security.262    
 
Netanyahu and his staff´s ignorance concerning Palestinian´s economic situation and 
the international aid effort were evident from the beginning. It was clear to the MFA 
that the novel government only prioritized what they had to deal with. As the peace 
process continued, this caused such considerable worries for the Norwegians that the 
MFA started referring to this tendency as the Likud´s government´s “First Thing First” 
principle. The main problem was that the AHLC was not prioritized on any level. In 
order to solve this, the MFA considered it important to throw a meeting as soon as 
possible in order to pressure the Israelis into a more active involvement.263 
Subsequently, on September 5, 1996 an informal AHLC meeting was held in 
Washington which emphasized to the participants that that the economic and social 
conditions for the Palestinians were moving in a negative direction because of the 
frequent border closures throughout 1996.264  
 
Another main topic in the AHLC meeting was Arafat´s refusal to consolidate accounts 
under the Ministry of Finance. Arafat had funds outside the control of the Ministry of 
Finance, which was subdued to his personal control.265 According to Rex Brynen, 
these funds were primarily used to finance Arafat´s patronage way of ruling, as 
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opposed to the institutional model of the West.266 Money that were left out of the 
budgetary control of the Ministry of Finance were revenues from quasi-private 
monopolies that distributed key necessities to the Palestinians such as petroleum 
products and cement.267 On January 9, 1996, the “Tripartite Action Plan” was revised 
and Arafat and his companions committed to consolidate accounts before January 31, 
1996. However, by September, Arafat still had not honored his promise and the donor 
countries exerted considerable pressure on the Palestinians. The message the 
Norwegians emphasized to the Palestinians on behalf of the donors was clear: if Arafat 
was not willing to ensure transparency, the donor countries were no longer willing to 
donate aid to the Palestinians.268   
 
Due to problems, both on the Palestinians side and on the Israeli side, the donors 
became more reluctant and used more political caution with regard to the aid effort. 
The United States withheld ten million USD and terminated all future aid to the Holst 
Fund.269 Canada was unsure whether it could continue its level of aid as they 
considered aid a continuation of payments to cover the running expenditures, which 
paved the way for an Israeli closure politic that Canada was against.270 The World 
Bank was not willing to give more money for budget support before the accounts were 
consolidated as this violated the TPA.271 In a meeting in Gaza on September 18, 1996, 
intended to follow up the AHLC meeting in Washington, the EU made it clear that 
they were not willing to give more financial support before the Palestinians 
consolidated the accounts and the Israelis were more willing to share responsibility 
with regard to taxes etc.272  
 
Norway did not chain any such conditionality to the aid in contributed, rather on the 
contrary as the Norwegian high level of aid became even higher in 1996. The increase 
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from 340 million in 1995 to 440 million NOK in 1996 was due to an increase in 
Norwegian aid to emergency measures, TIPH, and the People-to-People 
Programme.273 Furthermore, more money was granted to Norwegians NGOs working 
in the Palestinian Areas and to UNRWA. Additionally, some of the sum was support 
for the refugees in Lebanon, which had been increased as a result of the Israeli 
invasion.274 By November 1996, the Norwegians had contributed 17.7 million USD to 
budget support through the World Bank since the creation of the Holst Fund.275 One 
reason why there was a difference between Norway and the other donor countries, 
according to the MFA, was that the aid to the Palestinians still served Norwegians 
interests as it maintained the role as chair of the AHLC. This role was considered 
important to Norwegian interests, also outside the AHLC context. In 1998, Foreign 
Minister Knut Vollebæk expressed the rational for prioritizing the prominent role in 
the aid effort in the following manner:  
Our engagement in the Middle East has made us interesting. When I talk with Kinkel (German 
Foreign Minister), with van der Brock (Commissioner in the EU) and Talbott (US Deputy 
Secretary of State), they are very interested in what happened in the Middle East. What did I get 
out my visit there? What is my view on this? And then I can include someting about salmon and 
gas market directive and such, because I have already given them something.276 
Furthermore, the Norwegians had wanted to use their own effort as a manner of 
serving as example for the donor countries since it assumed the position as chair of the 
AHLC. The example it set in 1996 clearly encouraged all donor countries to increase 
their financial contribution, as the Israeli border closures were more frequently 
implemented and thus impacted the Palestinian budget more heavily. This was taken 
notice of in the Storting. On June 5, 1996 Erik Solheim, Leader of the Socialist Left 
Party and member of the Storting, asked Godal in a open Storting session:  
What I want to ask the Foreign Minister to confirm is that he will counter that we´re now moving 
into a hostage situation in which the international community becomes hostages for Likud´s 
restrictive politics, and accepts the Israeli cuts of their contributions and that these shall be covered 
by the international contribution…will Norway, as leader of the AHLC, ensure itself that we do 
not risk becoming hostages for the Israeli economic and foreign policy´s cutbacks? 
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Godal answered that he expected that Erik Solheim was aware that it was not 
benevolent for a Foreign Minister to answer such hypothetical question.277 
 
Even though Godal was not able or willing to answer the hypothetical question, the 
truth of the matter was that Norway had few other choices, as the chair of the AHLC, 
than to encourage the donor society to increase aid as the living conditions among the 
Palestinians approximated unbearable. The Norwegians recognized that the role as 
chair would be more challenging when the political peace process came to a halt. The 
donor countries were forced to reprioritize the aid effort to meet the acute crisis. For 
Norway, this meant that it was necessary to be even more flexible and go back to again 
focusing Norwegian aid on short-term aid in order to mend the consequences of the 
Israeli border closures.278 Though the situation appeared dark, the MFA had little 
belief in that the closure politics that the Israelis were pursuing could go on. According 
to diplomat Tor Wennesland: “such solution cannot be combined with a continuation 
of the peace process, which, at the end of the day is the only realistic way to go for the 
states and the peoples of the Middle East region”279 This would partially prove true, as 
the frequency of the border closures actually went down after Netanyahu assumed 
office.280 
 
The Hebron Protocol  
In the middle of the night on September 24, 1996, Netanyahu opened a new entrance 
to an ancient underground passage along the Wailing Wall and in the heart of the most 
holy Muslim sites of Jerusalem.281 This incident provoked strong reactions amongst 
the Palestinians and fighting scenes similar to that of the Intifada in 1987 arose. The 
difference from the Intifada, however, was that this time the Palestinians had a police 
force consisting of thousands of trained men to fight against the Israeli IDF.282 The 
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battle lasted for three days and only calmed down when the IDF threatened with 
moving into the Palestinian cities with armor. A cease-fire was agreed on. By then the 
short, but brutal resurgence had already ended about seventy Palestinian and fifteen 
Israeli lives.283  
 
The involvement of the Palestinian Police Force in violent clashes between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis was a concern for the Norwegians, as they had donated 
extensively and held wide-ranging responsibility for the aid to the PPF since its 
creation.284 The Israelis had granted Arafat permission to expand the PPF in order to 
deal with Palestinian terrorism in a more efficient manner and hence enhance security 
for the Israelis. While the Cairo Agreement had allowed 7000 recruits to the PPF, Oslo 
II stipulated the number to 30,000. By year 2000, this number would increase to 
50,000.285 In mid-1995, subsequent to publicity concerning the application of abusive 
measures in the PA, the Norwegians had decided to cut back their all-encompassing 
engagement in the police aid sector.286 Human rights violations performed by the PPF 
on the Palestinian population were a widely recognized problem and particularly 
worrisome to Norway.287 When TAP was updated, subsequent to the interim 
agreement, the Palestinians wanted the clause that set the upper limit for the budget 
deficits as a condition removed. The Norwegians strongly opposed this desire, as this 
clause prevented the Palestinians from having a bigger police force, and the 
Norwegians thought it was better that the police force did not keep expanding.288 
Nonetheless, despite Norwegian attempts to cut back their responsibility in relation to 
the police, no one else wanted to assume their position and the Norwegians had few 
choices than to continue their involvement even as the police force was gradually 
expanded. Professor Hilde Henriksen Waage, who has published extensively on the 
Norwegian role in the Middle East, contends that 
It [Norway] was still unhappy about its heavy involvement with a problematic police force. But 
nobody else wanted to take over, Norway was the only acceptable candidate and it would not run 
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away from its obligations—even when these were clearly risky and unpleasant. Norway was 
committed to making peace in the Middle East.289  
Norway was not the only country that was concerned; the United States was startled 
by the severity of the violent outbreaks between the Palestinians and the Israelis. In 
order to save what could be saved of the peace process, the Americans therefore 
intervened by assuming an active mediating role.290 When Netanyahu subsequently 
initialed the Hebron Protocol on January 15, 1997, approximately four months after 
the tunnel crisis, it was considered a major breakthrough for the mere reason that 
Netanyahu signed an agreement with the Palestinians. The agreement itself had 
already been negotiated and concluded by the Labor Party in September 1995, but then 
it had been suspended due to extensive terror attacks.291 The Hebron Protocol was an 
extension of the second interim agreement and divided the hand-over of Hebron into 
several phases. In the beginning of this process an external body of observers would 
monitor the transition.292 After the first agreement on Hebron, Norway had again taken 
on the responsibility to serve in a Temporary International Presence in Hebron and had 
implemented this alone through a mission lasting for three months.293 After this novel 
version of the agreement, the TIPH mission was implemented yet again, this time as a 
cooperation project between Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Denmark, Sweden, 
and Norway.294 Netanyahu altered the original agreement in Israeli favor in multiple 
ways but primarily by giving the Israeli settlers, which only constituted approximately 
0.3 percent of the population, a whole twenty percent of the town´s commercial 
centers. The Palestinian population was given eighty percent of the land and the 
administration of this land was subjected to numerous restrictions.295  Nonetheless, 
five days later, when the Israeli military withdrew from most of Hebron and the 
Palestinians assumed control, it was still considered a historic achievement in the 
peace process, as even the Israeli conservatives now worked towards peace.296  
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The donor countries, and particularly the MFA, again felt optimism as for the future of 
the peace process and the efficiency of the donor effort.297 Nevertheless, the optimism 
didn’t last for long as the Israelis failed to implement the decisions made in the Oslo 
Agreements and move forward with the negotiations as planned in the DoP. The 
political cost for Netanyahu in signing the Hebron Protocol meant that he needed to 
toughen up in other causes and he adopted a strict line of confrontational politics, 
which went against the land for peace principle that the Oslo Process was based on. 
This meant that no further progress was achieved in the peace process, rather on the 
contrary.298 The lack of development was not only political; the continuous economic 
deterioration of the Palestinian budget was just as big a problem. The prolonged and 
severe border closures in 1996 had worsened the economic situation in Gaza and the 
West Bank considerably.299 In a Storting gathering in April 1996, Paul Chauffey, a 
Socialist Party politician, asked Foreign Minister Godal whether, granted the 
asymmetrical power relation between the two adversaries, it was about time to state 
more explicitly that Israel was destroying the peace process with its consistent border 
closures. Godal replied that he was certain that Israel would give in to Norwegian and 
international pressure and soon open the borders as Israel understood that “In the long 
run, it is impossible to insert lots of capital into a big black hole consisting of 
Palestinian economy, which is not given living room to develop. I know that wise 
Israelis understand this and this is why alleviations are about to happen.”300 Contrary 
to Godal´s calculations, the borders between the Israelis and the Palestinians were 
completely closed for a whole 82 days in 1996 and this led to devastating 
consequences for the Palestinian economy.301 Moreover, despite the optimism in terms 
of Israeli goodwill, Godal´s statement demonstrated that the strong belief in the 
correlation between aid and peace had started to crack. Nevertheless, as aid became 
increasingly important to avoid a catastrophe to occur in the West Bank and Gaza, it 
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was not an option for the Norwegians to back out of the aid effort. In 1997, the donor 
countries made various reports that attempted to view the situation from a positive 
angle by stating that, in view of what one had projected to be the outcome of the 
border closures in 1996, the development of the Palestinians was much better than 
expected.302 The budget for running expenditures covered by the Holst Fund, for 
example, approximated balance for the first time since the Oslo Agreement.303 
Nevertheless, this did not change the fact that the overall economic situation continued 
to deteriorate. While one item within the overall budget, the running expenditure, 
approximated balance, other budget items moved further away from balance.304  
 
The pace of this trend was accelerated in January, when the Israeli escalated their 
settlement policy by initiating the constructions in Har Homa, a hill in annexed East 
Jerusalem between the Arab village of Um Tuba and Bethlehem. This site was a 
strategic move in the facts-on-the-ground approach and would link the chain of Israeli 
settlements in such way that the contact between the Arab side of Jerusalem and the 
Palestinian areas would be cut off.305  Consequently, from March 1997, Palestinian 
terror attacks became even more frequent and the closures remained persistent. This 
cycle of violence and closure dug the economic situation of the Palestinians further 
and further away from a positive balance.306 
 
As the budget moved further into a negative trend, the situation between the donors 
too became uneasy and competitive. Most of the donor countries faced critical 
questions from their governments and respective citizens, as it became more evident 
that the donor effort did not succeed in improving the economical situation for the 
Palestinians. The EU countries, in particular, were frustrated over this.307 Even in 
Norway, despite the influential role that Norway played as chair of the donor effort, 
the national newspapers critically examined the rational behind the Norwegian aid to 
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the Palestinians, which in 1997 had reached 36.7 million NOK per month.308 Further 
complicating the situation, the United States vetoed Security Council resolutions that 
could have halted the Israeli settlement expansion in Har Homa.309 Hence, as it 
became evident that the Palestinian economy moved in a negative direction despite the 
extensive aid, the political differences between the main donors in the aid effort 
escalated in tact with the deterioration of the political situation between the Israelis 
and the Palestinians. As the five-year period that the donor countries had pledged 
money for in 1993 approximated its conclusion, the status of the aid effort was highly 
insecure, and the Norwegian role as middleman and chief coordinator was thus more 
challenging than ever before.310  
 
Chapter 6: Still Going Strong (1998-2000)  
The Interim Period Approaches its End  
1998 was the last year of the five-year interim period envisioned in the Oslo 
Agreement and also the end of the time-span for which Norway and the other donor 
countries had pledged money.  The timetable laid out in the DoP went over five years, 
and this was the reason why the donor countries had pledged money for that same 
period in the Washington Conference in 1993.311 However, the status of the peace 
process after five years was not what the donor countries envisioned when they signed 
the agreement in 1993. The aim set forth in the DoP was that economic prosperity for 
the Palestinians would have improved the security situation and enabled the PLO and 
the Israelis to reach a permanent solution to the conflict.  Nevertheless, in the AHLC 
meeting in Washington on November 7, 1997 donors expressed disappointment that 
there was a continuing decline in the Palestinian economy.312 Approximately one 
month later, in the fifth Consultative Group meeting, the World Bank released a 
statement: 
Many of you were here for the first CG for the West Bank and Gaza, in December 1993. The 
atmosphere then was very different. There was a sense of anticipation. We were quite confident 
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that Palestinian economic skills would at last flourish; that sustained growth was feasible; and that 
a sound economy would make a major contribution to peace. That was almost exactly four years 
ago. Where do we find ourselves today? Clearly not where we expected to be…To put it bluntly: 
we expected the economic program to succeed, and to strengthen the political process. Instead, 
political conflict has undermined the Palestinian economy and blunted the efforts of the donors.313 
As the interim period approached its end without having achieved the goals set forth, 
the donor society and the adversaries were anxious to identify what would happen in 
the future in terms of aid.  
 
Securing the Continuation of the Norwegian Role in the Peace Process  
For this special year of the peace process, the Norwegians focused on the development 
of reports and plans that would encourage the donor countries to continue their 
assistance to the Palestinians. The MFA commissioned Fafo to create a report on the 
socio-economic development in the Palestinian society and its influence on the 
strategy for the upcoming aid effort in order to plan for the Norwegians continuation 
of aid to the Palestinians.314 Furthermore, the Norwegians helped the Palestinians both 
financially and with consultants to create the “Palestinian Development Plan” (PDP), 
which they could present for the donor society as time had come for new pledges to be 
presented.315 As the PDP was presented in the CG meeting in December 1997, Norway 
was commended by the World Bank for showing flexibility as a donor in terms of 
allocating revenues from one project to another that should serve as example for the 
other donors.316  
 
Not everyone, however, was equally happy with the Norwegian role in the peace 
process, and in the beginning of 1998 the EU moved to assume the role as chair of the 
AHLC through a highly confrontational diplomatic line.317 One reason for this move 
was that they were frustrated with the AHLC process, which had not given concrete 
results in the lives of the Palestinians, and they considered the AHLC as exclusively a 
way to cover up for the negative consequences of the Israeli politics. Despite all the 
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money spent, no improvement in the lives of the Palestinians had happened.318 The EU 
was disappointed that Norway left these economic concerns out of the summaries from 
the AHLC meetings; this should be done even though it was sensitive to some parties. 
It was particularly pointed out that the summaries were too positive as the Norwegians 
did not criticize the Israelis sufficiently.319 According to some EU-countries, Norway 
had moved in a more Israel-friendly direction. The British were particularly mentioned 
in this context, as they had received signals from the Palestinians who had asked 
questions regarding the role of the Norwegians.320 Furthermore, the EU also argued 
they would better serve as chair than Norway as they had more power to stand against 
the more Israel-friendly US policy than Norway did.321 As Norway, the EU had 
evaluated the donor experience thus far and concluded that the EU did not play the 
role they deserved, granted that they were the biggest donor. The EU thus wanted to 
take over the role as chair and pressured the Norwegians to withdraw voluntarily.322 In 
a meeting to get the United States to support this plan, the EU´s Vice President 
Manuel Marin had surprised the Americans by hitting his fist in the table and 
demanding that the Americans made a choice between the United States and Norway: 
“you will have to decide who you value the most!”323 Xavier Prats Monne, member of 
Marin´s Cabinet, said that the EU was particularly impatient with regards to “Israeli 
obstruction of practical measures to hinder the development of the Palestinians 
economy.”324  
 
Granted the deep involvement of Norway in the peace process between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis, the loss of their function as chair for the AHLC would be 
devastating for the Norwegians. This prominent role was used as a justification for the 
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Norwegian high level of aid to the failing peace process.325 The Norwegians 
consequently counterclaimed to the EU that they were not willing to withdraw 
voluntarily as they had gained the role as chair because of their facilitative role in the 
creation of the peace agreement.326 Fortunately for Norway, it eventually became 
evident that not all countries in the EU agreed on the criticism of the Norwegian role. 
Norway´s neighbor countries Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden defended the 
Norwegians as they thought that Norway was best suited for the job. The EU thus 
commonly decided to wait and see how the Norwegians responded to the criticism in 
the upcoming AHLC meeting.327  
 
The next AHLC meeting was the first one held in Oslo, a location that served to 
emphasize the Norwegian role as chair. The Americans had recently tried to resume 
bilateral negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but the attempt had 
failed, and the AHLC was the only remaining operational part of the peace process. 
The meeting established, yet again, that the economy was deteriorating; according to 
numbers based on the GNP, the living standard had gone down throughout 1997.328 In 
the summary of the meeting, the Norwegians wrote “the meeting called on the 
Government of Israel to take action to alleviate this uncertainty [of the economy], 
particularly with regard to the movement of people and goods.”329 This was a hint of 
criticism of Israel, but it remained to see whether it was enough for the EU.  
 
A few weeks later, the EU Commission presented a non-paper about the coordination 
structure of aid to the Middle East, which suggested that the EU should aim to assume 
the chair role from the Norwegians.330 It did include that the Norwegians had 
suggested co-chairing an upcoming Minister Conference in Washington with the EU 
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and that this was a good solution in order for the EU to learn from the Norwegians.331 
The Norwegian responded by presenting their own non-paper that suggested that the 
Norwegians would remain the chair of the AHLC, but that the role as chair would be 
divided between the Europeans and the Norwegians whenever the AHLC meetings 
were held in Europe.332 Through this suggestion, they hoped to end the quarrel over 
the role as chair for good. Both the EU and the United States accepted this suggestion, 
and the Norwegians had thus secured their role in the aid effort to the Middle East for 
the future.333 
 
Progress in the Peace Talks 
Though the Norwegians had established their role in the coordinating structure of the 
aid effort for the future, the outlook of the peace agreement was much less secure. 
Little progress had been made since Likud was elected into government, rather on the 
contrary. In November, however, the Wye River Memorandum gave Norway and the 
other donor countries renewed hope that the peace process could still move in the right 
direction. Even though the agreement was a result of severe pressure from the 
Americans, it was the first sign of cooperation between Arafat and Netanyahu for 
nineteen months. The memorandum gave the Palestinians a chunk of Israeli occupied 
territory on the West Bank in exchange for Palestinian antiterrorist measures followed 
closely by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Furthermore, the accord contained a 
paragraph to restore the progress of the peace agreement and re-initiate the final 
settlement negotiations.334 In addition, the agreement included many paragraphs that 
were essential to the economic development in Gaza and the West Bank. The most 
important of these were the commitments to materialize the construction of the Gaza 
airport, the Gaza Port, the Gaza Industrial Estate, and the two safe passages between 
the West Bank and Gaza.335 The donor countries knew that a high-level ministerial 
meeting was approaching that would renew pledges for another five-year period, and 
the Wye River Memorandum gave the perfect momentum for such meeting. 
Subsequently, on November 30, 1998 there was a new donor conference in 
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Washington where the donors were expected to make pledges for a new five-year 
period.336 
 
Establishing the Level of Norwegian Assistance to the Palestinians for the 
next five year period (1998-2003)  
The foreign aid to the Palestinians had consistently exceeded the originally pledged 
one billion NOK since 1993. By 1998, the total Norwegian aid disbursed was 1,9 
billion, almost twice the sum intended for the Palestinians for the five-year interim 
period.337 The aid envisioned to the Palestinians for the interim period in 1993 was 
1.25 billion NOK, but this sum had already been spent by 1996.338 Therefore, new 
pledges had been made, and by 1998, the Norwegians were not donating 250 million 
annually as planned for in 1993, but more than 440 million NOK per year.339  
 
The Norwegian economic assistance had been based on a wish to combine 
negotiations with economic and social development in order for the Palestinian people 
to see the positive effects of peace process. The main sectors that this aid had funded 
were social development by funding education (e.g., reconstruction, educating 
teachers, construction of schools) and water (e.g., creating the water institution and 
trust creating work to enhance regional cooperation about water). Furthermore, for the 
purpose of developing economic progress, funding had gone to electricity in Gaza and 
northern part of the West Bank and to the Palestinians Statistical Bureau.340  
 
However, in 1998 it was evident that the peace process would not be completed by the 
deadline in May 1999 as stated in the DoP.341 Ambassador Svein Sevje, leader of the 
Representative Office to the PA in Gaza,342 wrote, “Even under the most optimistic 
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conditions, the implementation of the result of the final negotiations will require 
multiple years with continued aid effort and consolidation of the peace process.”343 
The annual report of NORAD acknowledged in 1998 that “aid cannot compensate for 
the lack of final political solution to the conflict between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis,” but argued that foreign aid “strengthened Palestinian ability to self-rule, 
which is a prerequisite for a long-term and stable peace solution with Israel.”344 Based 
in this rational and the great need for aid, the Norwegians still wanted to continue 
donating more than 400 million NOK per year for the period that the PDP covered and 
then consider downplaying the aid for the subsequent two years. The aid was meant 
for transitional assistance and the level of aid in 2002 and 2003 would be determined 
with this in mind. By maintaining the level of aid for three years and then phasing it 
down beginning in 2002, the Norwegians calculated that 1.3 billion NOK was 
adequate for the new five-year period.345 This was pledged in the Consultative Group 
meeting in February 1999 and was primarily intended for physical planning, water, 
energy, education, institution building, and human rights.346 
 
Disappointment  
The first phase of implementing the Wye River Memorandum had proceeded pretty 
well. Two percent of Area C became Area B, and 7.1 percent of Area B became Area 
A. The Palestinian National Council in return removed sections of the Palestinian 
Charter that expressed a desire for Israel to be terminated, and the PA implemented 
tough measures to defeat terrorism.347 Unfortunately, the progress proved temporary 
when the Israelis boycotted the agreement by not transferring five percent of the West 
Bank from Israeli control to joint Israeli-Palestinian control by the deadline of 
February 1999, as stipulated for phase two.348   
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Strong international pressure on the Israelis ensued with the Israeli decision to 
dismiss the Wye Memorandum, and this created an incentive for Israel to exploit 
all opportunities to damage the Palestinians image. In the Consultative Group 
meeting on February 4-5, the Palestinians presented the Palestinian Development 
Plan, which the Norwegians had helped them produce. This plan contained three 
different scenarios for the future; less, the same, and better. Some sections 
included maps for the envisioned future, which included all of the West Bank 
and Jerusalem. This aggravated the Israelis to such a degree that they left the 
meeting in protest. Negotiations were subsequently undertaken to pursue the 
Israelis to return to the meeting. The Norwegians, who were mainly in charge of 
these meetings, based their argumentation in the Oslo Declaration, but were still 
unable to bring the Israelis back to the summit.349 After the meeting, a letter was 
received by Foreign Minister Vollebæk from US Secretary of State, Madeleine 
Albright who thanked the Norwegian delegates by name for their outstanding 
effort in negotiating with Israel.350 
 
The Israeli government´s unwillingness to follow the Memorandum caused strong 
reactions on all sides of the political spectra in the collation government. One side 
needed a majority government in order to proceed out of the stalemated situation. In 
the end, Netanyahu and the majority of the Knesset found themselves voting in favor 
of dissolution of the current government and early elections. Subsequently, on May 17, 
1999 Ehud Barak, the Labor Party representative, won 56 percent of the votes. 351 
 
Ehud Barak Assumes Position as Prime Minister 
Ehud Barak was the former Israeli Minister of Defense and had served as Chief of 
Staff in Rabin´s cabinet. While he had opposed the Oslo Agreement in his former 
position, he had keenly promoted the peace platform of the Labor Party in the buildup 
to the election for Prime Minister in 1999.352 Whereas the victory of the Labor Party 
                                                
349 See chapter 4; MFA AHLC 308.82, 1999, Note, February 9, 1999.  
350 MFA AHLC 308.82, 1999, Letter from Secretary Albright to Foreign Minister Vollebæk, March 25, 1999.  
351 Morris, Righteous Victims, 647-650; Enderlin, Shattered Dreams, 102-110. 
352 Mark Levine, Impossible Peace (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2009), 61.  
	   	   	  
	   	   	  	  
73	  
 
revived the optimism of the donor countries, Arafat was not equally positive. He 
worried that the international pressure on the Israelis would be lessened now that 
Barak had been elected.353 One of the reasons why Arafat was skeptical to the new 
Israeli Prime Minister was that Barak wanted to negotiate the implementation of the 
Wye River Memorandum and the final status negotiations simultaneously. Barak, in 
other words, wanted to renegotiate the Wye River Memorandum, an agreement that 
was already sealed by the former government.354 Giving in to the American, Egyptian, 
and Israeli pressure, Arafat agreed to the arrangement proposed by Barak. Few weeks 
later, the Sharm el Sheikh Agreement, essentially a renegotiated version of the Wye 
River Memorandum, was signed on September 4, 1999.355  
 
Unfortunately, due to disagreements on what and how the Israelis would 
withdraw, failed rounds of final talks, and new terror attacks which resulted in 
Israeli delays, Barak and Arafat did not manage to complete an agreed 
framework for the final talks within February 13, 2000, which was a deadline 
Barak had wanted.356 The talks were resumed in March, but Barak was losing 
internal support in his government, which gave him less actual power. Bill 
Clinton, President of the United States, subsequently intervened in July in order 
to help the adversaries by hosting and mediating negotiations in Camp David. 
There are two versions of what happened during these negotiations. According to 
the first account, the Israelis offered larger concessions than ever before, but 
Arafat refused and was not willing to come up with a counter proposal of his 
own. In the second account, Barak proposed an agreement that was impossible 
for Arafat to accept, as it was a mere cover-up for Israel’s continued settlement 
policy and a complete ignorance of the Palestinian claim for a viable state.357  
Either way, the negotiations attested that the situation was unripe for a final 
settlement when the summit collapsed. Both Barak and Clinton publicly blamed 
Arafat for the break down of the negotiations. Arafat himself felt that he was 
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treated unfairly and threatened to declare unilateral statehood independently of 
Israel on September 13, but budged this under increasing international 
pressure.358 
 
The reaction among the Palestinians was strong. After seven years of peace 
process, imposed Israeli border closures, deteriorating social conditions and 
multiple life altering changes, the Al Aqsa Intifada broke out on September 28, 
2000.  The incident that triggered this massive insurgence was the visit of the 
new Likud Party leader Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount Compound. Despite 
warnings from Arafat, Netanyahu gave Sharon the permission to enter the 
compound. Riots of protests subsequently erupted and these demonstrations kept 
escalating.359 With the Intifada, any hope of approaching a completion of the 
final talks was over for many years and the economic consequences for the 
Palestinians were fatal. The losses were estimated to an astonishing eight million 
USD per day, both because of destruction and the side effects of the Israeli 
repercussions of closures.360 After two months, 32 percent of the Palestinians 
were below the poverty limit; this constituted an increase of 50 percent.361 Many 
of the projects that Norway was responsible for now came to a complete halt. 
This meant that 250-260 million NOK for the year 2000 had to be given to 
emergency measures, rather than the long-term projects that the money was 
intended for.362  
 
                                                
358 Morris, Righteous Victims, 659-660.  
359 Morris, Righteous Victims, 660-661.  
360 MFA AHLC 308.82 2000/00082, Gaza to MFA, December 6, 2000.  
361 MFA AHLC 308.82 2000/00082, Gaza to MFA, November 9, 2000.  
362 MFA AHLC 308.82/2000/00082, MFA to Tokyo, November 30, 2000.  
	   	   	  
	   	   	  	  
75	  
 
Epilogue:  
In September 2001, the Intifada had taken 1,599 Palestinian and 577 Israeli lives.363 
By March, Ehud Barak had resigned from his Prime Minister position and was 
succeeded by Likud´s right wing Ariel Sharon.364 He was opposed to the peace process 
and ruled accordingly. When Sharon reoccupied large sections of the West Bank, the 
Palestinians responded through terrorist attacks.365  The Oslo Peace Process was 
over.366 
 
In April 2003, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) became the first Palestinian Prime 
Minister.367 In august he visited Norway. The MFA considered whether to throw a 
celebration in honor of the tenth anniversary of the Oslo Peace Agreement during his 
visit. This would serve to emphasize the Norwegian prominent role in the process. In 
the end, it was concluded that it was highly unlikely that Abbas would want to 
participate in a high-profile celebration of the agreement and it was thus decided that 
the arrangement should be postponed.368  
 
After the Intifada and until this very day, the economic and political situation for the 
Palestinians has been extremely challenging. Currently in 2012, Norway is still chair 
of the AHLC. In its position as chair, the Norwegians have continued to encourage the 
donor community to give aid by serving as an exemplary donor. The Norwegian aid 
has continued to increase.  In 2011, Norway contributed, at the very least, 628.4 
million NOK per year only to the Palestinians living in the Palestinian Areas.369  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion  
As the 20th century approached its end, it was evident that the peace process initiated 
by the Oslo Agreement had failed in its mission to enable a peaceful coexistence 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis. After nearly a decade of extensive 
international aid flowing to the Palestinians, the situation was far less ripe for peace 
than it had been in 1993. The living conditions of the Palestinians had undergone a 
steady deterioration ever since 1993 and the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada was the 
final proof that the situation for the Palestinians was unbearable.370   
 
The contrast between this reality and the one the Norwegians had anticipated was 
unmistakable. In the initial phase of the peace process, the Norwegians had strongly 
believed that the incremental political approach of the Oslo Agreement would lead to a 
lasting peace.371 This assumption had been only strengthened by the massive 
international media circus, which had applauded the Norwegians´ achievement and 
thus appealed to the small oil-rich nation´s advocates of an idealistic engagement 
policy. This extensive attention boosted Norway´s national identity as altruistic peace 
creator. Jan Egeland, one of the most prominent Norwegians in the Oslo peace 
process, was considered the front figure of this altruism.372  
 
When it became evident that Norway would be not only an influential donor but also 
the chair of the AHLC during the interim period, this reinvigorated the MFA´s sense 
of satisfaction with its philanthropy —not only was the peace engagement in 
Norwegian interest, but Norway emerged as the only acceptable leader and thus an 
irreplaceable actor in the peace process. The Norwegians, therefore, considered the 
crucial role they played, both in the construction of the Oslo Agreement and in the 
following peace process, as very important. Subsequently, since 1993, the Norwegians 
demonstrated that they were willing to go far - further than most other donor countries 
- to ensure peace in the Middle East.   
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Norway´s role as mediator in a historic peace agreement placed Norway on the map of 
international negotiations and gave the small nation the recognition it desired. Norway 
received a new reputation as a peace nation and was praised nationally and 
internationally. It thus became highly important for Norway that the agreement 
succeeded and that peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis was actualized.  
 
The Norwegian Role in the Aid Effort to the Palestinians through the 
Lenses of Entrapment Theory 
 
The Strategy 
The Norwegians, as many other donors, devised a strategy to support the peace 
process in 1993 that was premised on a linear progressive relationship between 
financial aid and the advance in the peace process.373 The main assumption behind this 
strategy was that financial assistance would improve the living conditions for the 
Palestinians, which would create security and mutual trust between the two adversaries 
and thus ripen the political situation for peace. This was the mantra of the Oslo peace 
process.374 
 
Furthermore, as mediator to the Oslo Agreement and chair of the AHLC, the 
Norwegian decision to donate extensive aid to the Palestinians from the onset of the 
peace process was predicated in a sense of responsibility. The Norwegians wanted to 
serve as an example for the other donor countries and in this manner also demonstrate 
to the donor community that Norway accomplished in reality what it preached in the 
AHLC meetings. As such, the Norwegian aid effort to the Palestinians was closely 
linked with the Norwegian role in the AHLC. On several occasions, the MFA argued 
before the Storting that it was essential that Norway appeared as an exemplary donor 
so as to encourage the other donor countries to also support the peace process 
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financially.375 In 1993, Norway increased its annual assistance to the Palestinians from 
65 million annually to 250 million NOK.  This was a major ‘investment’ and 
positioned the Palestinians as one of the top recipients of Norwegian aid.376 
 
In the Oslo peace process, the Norwegians considered themselves trendsetters in terms 
of advancing the strategy of giving aid as a means to improve security and create 
peace.  As chair of the donor society, Norway intended - based on a sincere belief in 
the correlation between aid and peace - to use its own donor efforts as an example to 
motivate the rest of the donor society in the right direction. Subsequently, though it 
may be argued that the strategy was the same for all the donors, the Norwegian case 
stands out as fairly distinctive.   
 
Why Did the Entrapment Occur?  
Recurrent Pattern of Failure and Reinforcement of Strategy 
Even though international aid to the Palestinians was increased sharply early in the 
peace process, a direct correlation between aid and improved living conditions failed 
to materialize. There were many reasons why the strategy failed in 1994. First and 
foremost was that the Palestinian apparatus to receive aid was not in place.377 
Furthermore, the donor countries set conditions for transparency and accountability 
that were close to impossible for the Palestinians to follow due to the lack of necessary 
regulatory institutions.378 In short, at the beginning of the peace process the strategy to 
give aid as a means to improve security and create peace failed partially because the 
money did not even reach the Palestinians.  
 
In the midst of intense efforts to remedy these problems, the Palestinian uprising in the 
aftermath of the Hebron Ibrahimiya Mosque massacre caused Israeli repercussion in 
the form of closures.379 The border closures further devastated the Palestinian 
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economy, and the political stagnation halted the progress of the peace process. In order 
to get the peace process back on track, Norway led and financed the Temporary 
International Presence in Hebron.380 This initiated the trend of Norwegian aid 
increasing whenever the peace process deteriorated.   
 
Despite these afore-mentioned issues, the Norwegian belief in aid as a strategy to 
create peace had not weakened – rather, the contrary. When the Cairo Agreement was 
signed, the Norwegians augmented their donor efforts. This expansion was partially 
based on the fear of becoming branded by other donor nations as irresponsible, due to 
the exacerbation of slow aid-implementation processes.381 The MFA did everything in 
their power to ensure that financial aid reached the Palestinians. Empirically, this 
meant accepting tasks, which were too politically sensitive for the other donor 
countries to deal with. The biggest of these was to support the Palestinian Police Force 
and create a less politically precarious channel through which the other donor 
countries could also donate aid to the PPF.  This required significant resources and 
served to expand the Norwegian financial contribution.382 Furthermore, when 
heightened political disagreements between the Palestinians and the Israelis induced 
the corrosion of meetings amongst the donor countries, it was necessary for someone 
to ensure that politics and aid were separated. The Norwegians, therefore, facilitated 
the Oslo Declaration, which prevented political discord between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians from effecting deliberations among donor countries concerning aid to the 
region.383  
 
While these problems caused the estimated budget deficit to gradually distance a 
positive balance, the Norwegian role in the peace process grew and Norway offered 
additional resources in order to supply the need demanded by the enlarged deficit. The 
donor countries had extensively discussed how it was possible to reverse the negative 
trend in the Palestinian economy, and it was decided to expand the local coordination 
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structure. This led to the establishment of the Joint Liasion Committee and the Local 
Aid Coordination Committee. As chair of the AHLC, Norway automatically assumed 
the co-chair for the LACC, and membership in the JLC, and this increased the 
Norwegian responsibility even further.384 In September 1994, when the Norwegians 
arranged the third donor group meeting, the estimated budget deficit had reached 145 
million USD. The expanded deficit did disgruntle the Norwegians, but they responded 
by again strengthening their efforts by pledging 13 million USD: approximately 
twelve percent, out of the total 102 million USD pledged by all donor countries.385 As 
the donor endeavors continued languishing, the Norwegians resiliently tried even 
harder.  
 
By February 1995, the slow implementation of aid as well as the frequent Israeli 
border closures caused the deficit to increase faster than the donors were able to 
provide funds.386 Granting the prominent Norwegian leadership role and the extensive 
Norwegian financial contributions, the MFA decided that the only option was to 
escalate the work and determination in the aid effort even further in order to avoid 
being blamed for the failure of the aid effort. The Norwegians considered it their 
responsibility to find some solution to bring the peace effort back on track. The 
Palestinian budget was in crisis and the Norwegians decided to call one last 
emergency-AHLC meeting in which they asked the donor countries to cover the 
expanding deficit. Well aware that the other donor countries were growing tired of 
offsetting the cost of the Israeli border closures, the Norwegians again set out to serve 
as an example and pledged 35 million NOK to the runaway expenditures.387 This 
brought the total-pledged Norwegian contribution to 61 million USD by April 1995.388 
As had happened before, when the aid effort and the entire peace process was in crisis, 
the Norwegian contribution increased. Nonetheless, in the AHLC meeting only sixty 
                                                
384 Brynen, A Very Political economy, 90. 
385 MFA AHLC 308.82 (4), Brussels to MFA, November 30, 1994; MFA AHLC 308.82 (4), Note, December 9, 
1994; MFA AHLC 308.82 (4), MFA to the AHLC member countries, November 8, 1994.  
386 MFA AHLC 308.82 (7), Tel Aviv to MFA, April 19, 1995.  
387 MFA AHLC 308.82 (7), Letter from Bjørn Tore Godal to Warren Christopher, US Secretary of State, April 
26, 1995; MFA AHLC 308.82 (8), MFA to Tel Aviv, May 26, 1995.  
388 MFA AHLC 308.82 (7), Letter from Bjørn Tore Godal to Warren Christopher, US Secretary of State, April 
26, 1995.  
	   	   	  
	   	   	  	  
81	  
 
million USD was pledged by member donor countries, far less than the 136 million 
USD required.389 While the Norwegian contribution was higher than before, the failure 
of the aid effort was more evident than ever.  
 
Fortunately, by September 1995, the main interim agreement was signed.390 The 
Norwegians, in collaboration with the other donors, did their best to exploit the 
momentum of the agreement to collect more aid: pledges of 1.3 billion USD were 
consequently made by the donor society.391 However, the political progress was highly 
temporary and a few months later Israeli border closures and Palestinian terrorist 
attacks were, again, causing big economic problems and instigating the deterioration 
of social conditions for the Palestinians.392 In mid-1995, Norway wanted to downsize 
their extensive involvement in the PPF, subsequent to reports of abusive measures and 
human rights violations; but since no country was willing to take over the Norwegians 
were stuck in their role as main responsible donor country. On June 5th, 1995 Erik 
Solheim approached the Storting, concerned that Norway wasn´t taking steps to avoid 
becoming “hostages for Israel´s economic and foreign policy´s cutback”.393 Foreign 
Minister Godal answered that he would not respond to such hypothetical questions.394 
However, the money pledged in 1993 that was supposed to last until 1998, was 
depleted by 1996.395 
 
In May 1996, Benjamin Netanyahu, representing Likud, assumed the position as Prime 
Minister. The political ideology of Likud was more negative towards the peace process 
than that of the Labor Party previously in power, and the forecast for the future of the 
peace process appeared dark. 396 Throughout 1996, the terror at the hands of the 
Palestinians became even more frequent and the Israeli border closures remained 
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persistent. This caused the further deterioration of the Palestinian economy and a 
difficult dilemma for the donor countries: the living conditions were worse than ever 
before for the Palestinians, and the only means to survival was through aid. 397 While 
many countries then downsized their financial contributions, the Norwegians 
maintained their high level of aid. By 1997, Norwegian aid to the Palestinians had 
reached an astonishing 36,7 million per month or 440 million in total. 398 
 
In 1998, the EU strove to replace Norway as chair of the AHLC. The reason for the 
high level of aid to the Middle East had always been justified in the Oslo agreement 
and the subsequent prominent role for the Norwegians. If the Norwegians would lose 
their leadership, it would make it even more difficult to justify the high level of 
Norwegian aid to the failing peace process. Norway managed to avoid this quandary 
by offering the EU a co-chair position whenever the AHLC meetings were held in 
Europe. 399 Still, the EU´s criticism of the Norwegians for their role in AHLC made it 
even more important for Norway to show that they were dedicated to the job: the need 
to be an exemplary donor subsequently grew. Paradoxically, Norway thus increased its 
aid efforts in order to maintain the chair role within the donor society, which, by 
inherent virtue of the nature of the leadership position, was used as a justification for 
the high level of aid to the Middle East.   
 
Even though the peace process was worse off than ever before and the Norwegian 
contribution was higher than ever, the Norwegians still upheld that the aid was a 
transitional contribution intended to economically underpin the political peace process. 
Therefore, when the five-year interim period ended in 1998 and it was upon the donor 
countries to make new pledges for the next five-year period, the Norwegians pledged 
1.3 billion NOK. The rationale for this decision was that they planned to maintain the 
aid at the high level of about 450 million NOK annually for the first three years and 
then decrease the aid when it became excessive. 400  In other words, none of the 
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setbacks and challenges that arose from 1990 to 2000 prompted the Norwegians to act 
contrary to the strategy based in the assumption of linear correlation between aid and 
peace. Moreover, the Norwegians had invested so much that the audience cost of 
admitting to failure was higher than continuing the failing strategy of increasing aid 
whenever additional problems arose.  
 
In 2000, a new Intifada erupted and the peace process officially collapsed. The 
economic consequences of the war further deteriorated the Palestinians´ circumstances 
and the dangerous political situation made most aid projects come to a complete halt. 
This forced Norway to reallocate long-term aid to short-term purposes. 401 The role in 
the AHLC continued, and it became even more important to set the example as donor 
fatigue rose. All in all, the Norwegian role as chair became increasingly difficult as the 
Oslo Agreement come to symbolize decreased living standards as opposed to being the 
harbinger of peace. The gradual reduction of aid that the Norwegians had intended to 
enact beginning in 2001, never materialized. By 2012, Norway was still chair of the 
donor group to the Palestinians and the contributions to the Palestinians living in the 
occupied territories alone had amassed to over 600 million NOK annually. 402   
 
The Entrapment  
As the peace process stagnated, it was evident that the aid to the Palestinians became 
increasingly political. Although the aid went primarily to the Palestinians, the Israelis 
also had a strong interest in international aid to the Palestinians: Even as the Israelis 
continued the occupation of territories pertaining to the Palestinians, the Israelis 
indirectly benefitted from the international society´s ‘paying of the bill’ for these 
territories in the form of development aid.403 Lead Country Economist for the Middle 
East in the World Bank, Radwan A. Shaban contends that “while emphasis was placed 
on improving Palestinian economic conditions at the signing of the Declaration of 
Principles, the Israeli economy benefited significantly from the peace dividend as the 
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Palestinian economy was allowed to collapse.”404 The Israelis thus took advantage of 
the international aid to continue its policy of expansion. Because the Israelis controlled 
most aspects of Palestinian life, the Palestinians became increasingly dependent on 
international aid as their situation deteriorated. Anne Le More has explained this in the 
following manner:  
Despite suffocating and consistently deteriorating Palestinian conditions on the ground, which 
became increasingly more discernible as the decade unfolded, international donors chose to remain 
steadfastly engaged, even if these conditions imposed critical limitations on the avowed political 
purpose, effectiveness, sustainability and legality of their intervention.405   
While Le More argues that this occurred because the donors were primarily 
concerned with their relationship with the United States and Israel, this is not a 
sufficiently comprehensive explanation in the Norwegian case.  
 
When formulating the strategy for the peace process, the Norwegians had not 
adequately considered the completely asymmetrical relationship between the 
adversaries. Consequently, the MFA had not foreseen that the Israelis could 
take advantage of the aid to precede their occupation. Hilde Henriksen Waage, 
who has written extensively on Norway´s ignorance of this problem of 
asymmetry, has explained it as such:  
Taking the asymmetry of power into consideration, the role Norway played was the only one it 
could in the given context. Like it or not, such was Norway´s room for maneuver. Either Norway 
did as best as it could within these parameters –or it would have to give up the entire process. 
Norway chose to stay put and make the best of the situation.406  
While the relationship with the United States was highly important to the 
Norwegians, the main reason for the continuous reinforcement of the faulty 
strategy was the altruistic belief in the correlation between aid and peace.407 
The belief that economic prosperity in the occupied territories would lead to 
peace entrapped Norway in a pattern where it was committed to increase 
economic support as the situation between the two conflicting parties 
deteriorated. As the Palestinians became increasingly dependent on 
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international aid, it was not an option for the chair of the donor society to 
decrease its donor efforts to the Palestinians: the audience cost of such a move 
was far too high as the implications for the novel, developing Norwegian 
reputation as peace maker would be devastating. As Paul Meerts observes: 
“entrapment is an increasing loss of alternatives. We are losing dimensions, 
becoming a one-dimensional man with only one choice: move on or withdraw. 
As long as the last option is not seen as realistic, the caravan will move on and 
the dynamics of entrapment will continue.”408 The Norwegians followed a 
strategy based on a linear relationship between aid and peace which they 
chose to reinforce numerous times, even as it became increasingly evident that 
the main assumption behind the strategy was misguided; this pattern gradually 
entrapped Norway whereas the audience cost of pulling out of the political aid 
effort was too high. 
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